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ABSTRACT 
 
Members of the invisible college of international investment lawyers 
are engaged in a fierce battle over the conceptual foundations of their 
common legal enterprise.  The debate centers on whether the international 
legal regime governing foreign direct investment is a de facto 
transnational public governance system or merely an institutional support 
structure for the settlement of essentially private investment disputes.  
These attempts to establish the public versus private nature of the regime 
are misconceived. International investment law deals with both public and 
private concerns, impacts upon both public and private actors, and 
crosses over traditional divides separating public law from private law 
and public international law from private international law.  In light of 
these overlaps, the regime should instead be analyzed from an integrated 
systems perspective.  This approach better comports with the regime’s 
complex interlocking nature.  It is also better suited to the pragmatic 
challenge of accommodating the conflicting claims of diverse stakeholders 
within the confines of an outmoded but rapidly evolving legal schema.  I 
illustrate this with concrete examples of minor interventions at three 
different levels of the regime that could produce major shifts in the 
prevailing balance between investor and non-investor rights at other 
levels of the regime.  I argue that this strategy represents at once a more 
feasible and more sensible means of improving international investment 
law than other alternatives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world in which the line between personal rights in property 
or contract and important public policy concerns – say environmental 
protection or public health – is drawn in the following way.  The 
individual who seeks vindication of her property rights against 
governmental regulatory encroachment appoints an arbitrator to hear her 
claim.  She selects the arbitrator she believes most likely to find in her 
favor, given the arbitrator’s record of past decisions.  The government 
whose regulatory measure prompted the complaint responds by appointing 
the arbitrator it believes most likely to absolve it of liability.  A third 
arbitrator is then selected to chair the three-person panel by a designated 
appointing authority – perhaps the secretariat of some international arbitral 
institution.  All of the arbitrators are lawyers by training, but none of them 
hails from the country whose sovereign act forms the basis of the 
complaint.   
The disputing parties then proceed to pay each of the three arbitrators a 
substantial daily fee
1
 to consider whether the maligned governmental 
regulation improperly impaired the property owner’s rights, and if so, how 
much compensation the government should pay to the owner as a result.  
The tribunal’s award, once issued, cannot be reviewed on the merits by 
any domestic court,
2
 and the property owner can enforce a favorable 
award by attaching state assets in 147 countries around the world.
3
  Upon 
                                                 
1
 The going rate in cases administered by the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) is $3000 per arbitrator per day.  See ICSID Schedule of 
Fees (Jan. 1, 2008), para 3, at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
scheduledFees&reqFrom=Main.  Other arbitral institutions set arbitrator compensation at 
a pre-specified percentage of the amount claimed.  See, e.g. International Chamber of 
Commerce [hereinafter ICC] Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules (2012), Appendix III, 
available at: http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-
ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/Download-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/ICC-Rules-
of-Arbitration-in-several-languages/. 
2
 Except on the limited procedural grounds set out under art. 52 of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened 
for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention], or, in some cases, under art. V of the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
3
 Subject to certain sovereign immunity defenses, enforcement of investor-state 
arbitration awards is generally governed by arts. 53–55 of the ICSID Convention or arts. 
III–V of the New York Convention, both supra, note 1.  As of the date of this writing, 
both conventions listed 147 contracting state parties. See List of Contracting States and 
Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID.WORLDBANK.ORG; 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
Contractingstates&ReqFrom=Main (listing state party signatories to the ICSID 
Convention) (last visited Sept. 11, 2012); Contracting States, 
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termination of the arbitral proceedings, the three-person tribunal dissolves 
and its members continue with their various other professional pursuits.
4
 
 It seems fair to say that few domestic legal scholars, if starting with a 
clean state, would be likely to propose this set-up as an optimal system for 
resolving conflicts between privately held rights and important public 
policy concerns.  But the world I have just described is not a fictional one.  
It is the contemporary international investment law regime.  The property 
owners in question are foreign investors, and the government appearing as 
defendant might be that of most nations in the world.   
Germany is currently facing an $18.7 billion dollar claim by Swedish 
energy investors over the German government’s decision to phase out 
nuclear power in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident.
5
  Australia 
is preparing to defend a multi-billion dollar claim by Philip Morris 
brought in response to that country’s recently enacted Tobacco Plain 
Packaging legislation.
6
  Belgium faces a $2.3 billion claim by a Chinese 
insurance company as a result of the government bailout and then sale of a 
Belgian-Dutch bank during the recent financial crisis.
7
  All of these claims 
will be adjudicated in the manner described above.  And Germany, 
Australia, and Belgium are actually quite lucky in the grand scheme of 
things; they are each only now facing their first investor-state claims.  The 
United States, by contrast, has already faced over twenty such claims
8
 by 
foreign investors seeking compensation for an array of governmental 
measures ranging from a California environmental regulation
9
 to a 
Mississippi state jury verdict.
10
   
                                                                                                                         
NEWYORKCONVENTION.ORG, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states 
(listing state party signatories to the New York Convention) (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
4
 Typically as law firm partners, arbitrators, expert witnesses, full or part-time law school 
professors, or some combination of these. 
5
 Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 (award 
pending); Vattenfall Launches Second Claim Against Germany, GLOB. ARB. REV. News 
(June 25, 2012), available at 
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30634/vattenfall-launches-second-claim-
against-germany/. 
6
 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law [hereinafter UNCITRAL], Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationallaw/Documents/Philip+Morris+Asia+Notice+of+Arbi
tration.pdf [hereinafter Philip Morris – Notice of Arbitration]. 
7
 Alyx Barker, Belgium Faces ICSID Claim from Chinese Investors, GLOB. ARB. REV. 
(Sep. 24, 2012). 
8
 A list of claims faced by the U.S. under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
[hereinafter NAFTA] is available here: http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_us.htm.  
Claims against the U.S. under the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement [hereinafter DR-CAFTA] are listed here: 
http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_us.htm.   and select bilateral investment treaties.  
9
 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL rules), Final Award 
of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), available at 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf [hereinafter “Methanex – 
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In fact, U.S. participation in the international investment law regime is 
especially deep.  The U.S. was a driving force behind the regime’s 
creation and continues to serve as one of its foremost supporters upon the 
world stage.  This seems puzzling in light of the fact that U.S. domestic 
law contains more sophisticated and democratically legitimate means of 
handling conflicts between investor rights and broader governmental 
regulatory concerns than farming them out to ephemeral international 
arbitration tribunals on a case-by-case basis.  
International law scholars in the U.S. and abroad have by and large 
reacted to this curious state of affairs in an even more curious manner.  
While many have begun to shine a critical spotlight on various aspects of 
the international investment law system, most reform proposals have 
worked outward from one of two initial premises.  On one side of the 
debate are those who view recent investor-state arbitral awards granting 
compensation to foreign investors for governmental regulatory activities 
as evidence that international investment law has morphed into a de facto 
public governance system operating on a transnational scale.
11
  On the 
other extreme are those who insist that international investment law is of 
little or no public concern, as it is nothing more than an institutional 
support structure for the efficient settlement of private investment 
disputes.
12
 
What is curious about these approaches is not only that they are both 
overly broad and insufficiently nuanced, but that they both take the 
fundamental question facing the international investment law regime to be 
a categorical one:  is it a public regime or is it a private one?  Divergent 
                                                                                                                         
Award”].  Unless otherwise specified, all publicly available investor-state arbitral awards 
discussed in this paper may be accessed at http://italaw.com/awards/chronological (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
10
 The Loewen Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Award, (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005) [hereinafter Loewen Group – Award]. 
11
 See, most notably, Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006);  GUS VAN 
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007) [hereinafter VAN 
HARTEN]; DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: 
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008) [hereinafter SCHNEIDERMAN]; 
SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2009) 
[hereinafter MONTT], INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC 
LAW, (Stephan Schill ed, 2010) [hereinafter Schill (ed.) – IIL & COMPARATIVE PUBLIC 
LAW]; Stephan Schill, Enhancing the Legitimacy of International Investment Law: 
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J.  
INT’L L. 57–102 (2011) [hereinafter Schill – New Public Law Approach]. 
12
 Examples of works espousing the private dispute settlement perspective (by analogy to 
international commercial arbitration) include: Barton Legum, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’s Contribution to International Commercial Arbitration, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 
71, 73 (2005); Charles N. Brower, W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration?, 24 
ARB. INT’L 181, 190 (2008).  See also Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law 
Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
507 (2009) (viewing the regime through the lens of private contract law). 
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prescriptive recommendations then flow almost automatically – in 
conflicting directions – from the answer to this question.  But it is possible 
to raise a different question in respect of the regime’s ongoing 
classificatory debate.  Namely, does it even matter? 
In this paper, I argue that it doesn’t.  I propose that the international 
investment law regime and its most pressing problems should instead be 
analyzed from an integrated systems perspective.  That is, rather than 
asking what is it? (a classificatory question), we should focus on figuring 
out how it works in real time and how it can be improved.  How do 
different aspects of the regime interact with one another?  How does the 
regime as a whole interact with other legal regimes at both the domestic 
and international levels?  And most importantly, how are intra- and inter-
regime feedback loops dynamically shifting the line between the 
protection of investor and non-investor rights and interests over time?  
Only against the backdrop of this more integrated understanding of the 
international investment law system does it become possible to generate 
useful suggestions for targeted regime reform, whether on a piecemeal or 
wholesale basis. 
In order to make the case for an integrated systems approach to 
international investment law, the remainder of this paper proceeds as 
follows.  Part I explains why the public/private framing has gained such 
salience in the international investment law world notwithstanding the fact 
that many other scholarly traditions have consistently rejected this framing 
as unworkable.  It describes some of the historical, structural, 
jurisprudential, and sociological peculiarities contributing to the 
perception that international investment law generates acute public/private 
tensions not typical of other areas of international law.  These peculiarities 
help explain why the scholarly debate has so far focused on establishing 
whether international investment law is a private dispute settlement 
system or a transnational public governance system.  I critique the 
descriptive utility of these dominant accounts from three perspectives:  
those of the investor, the state, and the third-party outsider to the investor-
state relationship.   
Part II lays the groundwork for moving beyond this rudimentary 
debate.  It does so by charting the overlaps and disjunctions between 
traditional public/private distinctions and the contemporary practice of 
international investment law.  The discussion shows how the investment 
law system impacts upon both public and private actors, incorporates both 
public law and private law claims and defenses, and draws sources and 
methods from both public international law and private international law.  
In light of this clear straddling of classical public/private divides, I suggest 
that the frequent invocation of public and private concepts within the 
international investment law system has little to do with the system’s 
essential nature.  Rather, it reflects strategic attempts by competing 
stakeholders to advance certain contested propositions at the expense of 
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others.  This serves to obscure, rather than resolve, underlying normative 
tensions. 
Part III introduces the integrated systems perspective as an alternative 
analytical tool. Since international investment law’s public and private 
features are overlapping and at times even mutually constitutive, a better 
way to analyze the regime is to view it as a complex dynamic system.  To 
illustrate why the integrated systems perspective is useful, I apply it to the 
central question that has preoccupied most of the investment regime’s 
critics:  how, where, and by whom is the line between investor rights and 
non-investor rights (including, potentially, the “public interest”) drawn?   
I propose three different places where making minor adjustments to 
discrete components of the existing regime could produce significant re-
alignments in the balance struck between investor and non-investor rights 
and interests at other levels of the regime’s functioning.  I connect the 
three proposals back to the case studies developed in Part I in order to 
show what difference each one might make in practice.  My central aim, 
however, is not to definitively establish the superiority of the three specific 
proposals.  Rather, it is to persuade reform advocates to take advantage of 
international investment law’s many interlocking feedback loops so as to 
strategically direct the regime’s rapid evolution in an iterative fashion.13  I 
argue that this represents the most productive strategy, in the near term, 
for tackling the system’s much touted accountability and legitimacy 
problems.   
I. WHENCE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW’S PUBLIC/PRIVATE CRISIS? 
The persistence and vehemence of the public/private debate within 
international investment law is in some ways baffling.  A diverse array of 
scholarly traditions has, over the course of a century, consistently trounced 
the public/private distinction as artificial, unworkable, or even downright 
pernicious.  Legal realists began exposing the artificiality of the divide in 
the early 1900s when they recast prevailing conceptions of “private” 
contract and property rights as mere reflections of coercive “public” 
political power relations.
14
  New Deal theorists and their state action 
doctrine progeny
15
 then demonstrated the unworkability of the divide 
insofar as it relates to state action versus inaction.  Many eventually 
                                                 
13
 My approach thus works within the existing regime and attempts to “build on the 
classic model”, as prominent investment arbitrator Charles Brower recently put it.  See 
Alison Ross, London:  Build On the Classic Model, Urges Brower, 7(3) GLOB. ARB. REV. 
(May 21, 2012). 
14
 See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Robert Hale, 
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 
(1923); Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1928). 
15
 For one account of the activist state literature, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984). 
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concluded, as Cass Sunstein put it, that “state action is always present.”16  
As to perniciousness, the use and abuse of public/private rhetoric to 
perpetuate dominant hierarchies and oppress dissenting voices has been a 
constant refrain of critical legal scholars,
17
 feminists,
18
 and many others.
19
 
Placed alongside this larger discourse, it seems likely that international 
investment law’s public/private debates are actually a microcosm of a 
much older discussion.  Why, then, have international investment law 
scholars not learned from these other traditions?  Why do we continue to 
fixate on notions of public and private as if these held the key to solving 
the regime’s problems?  There are four main answers to this riddle: one 
historical, one structural, one jurisprudential, and one sociological.  In 
what follows, I take each in turn.   
Before moving to these explanations, however, one preliminary caveat 
bears stressing.  My goal, in this part, is not to present the international 
investment law regime in a comprehensive, nuanced, or even balanced 
manner.  Rather, it is to highlight the reasons why – rightly or wrongly – a 
vocal segment of scholars, civil society advocates, journalists, government 
officials, and other critics has come to view the regime as an epic battle 
between private investors and the public interest.  Focusing on these 
reasons to the exclusion of competing considerations inevitably makes the 
presentation one-sided.  Not all international investment disputes raise 
public policy concerns.  And among those that do, it is far from inevitable 
that the final result will be an award which impacts negatively upon the 
public interest.
20
  At the level of substantive law, some states have made 
                                                 
16
 Cass R. Sunstein, State Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 465 (2002).  See 
also Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); William W. Van Alstyne & 
Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Charles L. Black, Jr., 
Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. 
L. REV. 69 (1967). 
17
 For an overview, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the 
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982). 
18
 See e.g. Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in 
American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, (1987); CHALLENGING THE 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997); 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES (Margaret Thornton ed. 1995); Frances 
Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 
CONST. COMMENT. 319. 
19
 See generally Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction's Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
719, 728 (2005) (noting that public and private power are at once mutually dependent and 
mutually differentiated). 
20
 E.g. in the Methanex decision, supra note 9, the tribunal did not find the United States 
financially liable for the reduction in profits suffered by the claimant in consequence of 
California’s environmentally motivated ban on the sale of the claimant’s product. 
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significant strides in recent years toward making their investment treaties 
more sensitive to the concerns of non-investors.
21
   
These and other countervailing developments are important.  As I 
argue in the third part of this paper, some of them may well hold the key 
to redressing many of the regime’s most pressing problems.  But in order 
to understand the origins of international investment law’s particular 
public/private dilemmas, it is necessary to focus on the aspects of the 
system that have generated a public backlash rather than on those that 
have not.  With this in mind, I now turn to consider why the regime’s 
potential public impact has recently become the subject of concerted 
scholarly, civil society, and governmental debate. 
A. Unanticipated evolutionary twists and turns 
The historical answer is that nobody saw it coming.  When the 
contemporary international investment law regime was established in the 
mid-20
th
 century, the regime’s founders expected it to serve a very basic 
function:  protect the investments of developed country nationals against 
opportunistic expropriations carried out by transitioning, post-colonial 
developing country governments.
22
  The idea was that by providing 
privately actionable protections to foreign investors, backed by a neutral 
international dispute settlement system, states could encourage the private 
sector to invest in developing countries, thereby stimulating economic 
growth to the benefit of all.
23
  This is not exactly how things have played 
out in practice. 
                                                 
21
 See, e.g. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. Model BIT 2012], Preamble (specifying that investment protection 
should be achieved “in a manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the 
environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights”), art. 29 
(mandating the transparency of arbitral proceedings), and Annex B, art. 4(b) (stating, 
“Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations”). 
22
 The regime’s historical roots stretch back to at least the late 1600s, with some of its 
basic legal principles finding early articulations in the Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation treaties of the European colonial powers and in judicial and arbitral 
pronouncements concerning the customary practices observed by those powers over the 
course of the 18
th, 
19
th
, and early 20
th
 centuries (such practices having at various points 
been deemed to form part of the “law of nations”). Notwithstanding this long history, 
most commentators place the birthdate of the contemporary system in its present form 
either in 1959 (the year of the adoption of the first modern bilateral investment treaty, 
concluded between Germany and Pakistan) or 1965 (the year in which the ICSID 
Convention, supra note 2, was opened for signature). 
23
 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.; see also International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, ¶ 9, in ICSID 
CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965). 
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At the time of the establishment of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), most investor-state disputes 
were based upon individually negotiated investor-state contracts.  They 
tended to proceed as ordinary breach of contract claims, resolved by 
ordinary international commercial arbitration.  ICSID registered 26 cases 
of this kind between 1965 and 1990,
24
 none of which produced any 
notable public outcry. 
But the fall of the Berlin Wall brought about a sea change for the 
regime.  With the simultaneous opening up of so many markets in Eastern 
Europe, a sort of gold rush ensued.  Multinational companies from 
developed countries raced to seize upon new investment opportunities in 
previously closed economies.  In these circumstances, taking the time to 
negotiate an investment contract with each host state’s government – even 
assuming a company with sufficient market power to do so – could mean 
losing out to nimbler competitors.  Bilateral investment treaties granting 
generalized protections to broad classes of foreign investors stepped in to 
fill this gap.
25
  Between 1990 and 2012, the number of international 
treaties protecting foreign investors and their investments abroad rose 
from 385
26
 to nearly 3200.
27
 
These fast-paced legal developments were soon followed by another 
profound shift in the global economy.  Important developing and 
transitioning economies that were once viewed as likely recipients of 
capital (traditional “host states”) began transforming into major originators 
of investment.  By 2012, their share of global FDI outflows had reached 
                                                 
24
 THE ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS (Issue 2012-2), Chart 1, at 7, (showing the total 
number of ICSID cases registered by calendar year), available at   
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English32 [hereinafter ICSID 
CASELOAD – 2012]. 
25
 Thanks to effective industry lobbying in the 1980s, the U.S., U.K., and several 
continental European countries had model BITs on-hand ready to do the job. 
26
 Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [hereinafter 
UNCTAD], Bilateral Investment Treaties Quintupled During the 1990s, (Dec. 15, 2000), 
TAD/INF/2877. 
27
 Of which 2857 are bilateral investment treaties and 339 are “other IIAs,” such as 
regional trade agreements with investment chapters. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 2013, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS, INVESTMENT, AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, 
101, U.N. Sales No. No. E.13.II.D.5, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=588 [hereinafter 
UNCTAD – WIR 2013].  The most persuasive account of the diffusion of BITs that I 
have seen to date can be found in Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the 
Claim Hits, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65(2) WORLD 
POLITICS 273 (2013). 
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35%,
28
 with $168 billion in outbound investment coming from China and 
Hong Kong alone.
29
 
All of these evolutions combined to create the perfect storm for 
international investment law.  They catapulted the regime almost 
overnight to a level of legal significance never fully anticipated by many 
of its principal architects and state participants.
30
  Developed countries 
that had aggressively promoted sweeping investor protections in 
international investment treaties began finding themselves on the receiving 
end of the investor-state arbitration stick. In the first two decades of 
operation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for 
example, Canada and the United States have each faced more investor-
state arbitration claims than Mexico.
31
   
The pace of legal claims has also accelerated exponentially.  Of the 
514 reported investment treaty arbitrations initiated by foreign investors 
against states to-date,
32
 more than 90% have been brought in the past 
twelve years.
33
  An increasing number of these claims now challenge the 
application to foreign investors of general regulatory measures long 
thought to fall within the legitimate and non-reviewable police powers of 
sovereign states.  Recent targets of investor ire have included 
environmental regulations, affirmative action measures, cultural protection 
laws, energy policies, and regulatory responses to economic crises.
34
  And 
while it remains difficult for companies to obtain compensation for profit-
reducing state regulatory actions in most domestic legal systems, empirical 
research shows that claimants win investor-state arbitration proceedings 
around 50% of the time.
35
 
                                                 
28
 UNCTAD – WIR 2013, supra note 27, at 4. 
29
 Id. at 6, figure 1.6.  For an analysis of China’s evolving investment treaty program, see 
Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall:  the New Generation Investment 
Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73 (2007). 
30
 The original expectations appear to have been that the regime would promote the flow 
of foreign direct investment to developing countries and that it would de-politicize the 
settlement of investment disputes by removing them from the realm of diplomatic 
protection.  See, respectively, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, ¶¶  9-10, 
Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965); and Ibrahim Shihata, Towards a Greater 
Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1 (1986). 
31
 See NAFTA ch.11 disputes by country at: http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes.htm. 
32
 UNCTAD – WIR 2013, supra note 27, at 110. 
33
 Id. at Figure III.3, at 102 (showing 514 arbitrations filed as of the end of 2010, with 
fewer than 50 filed prior to 2000). 
34
 An overview of some controversial cases from the first decade of the 21
st
 century is 
provided in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: KEY CASES FROM 
2000-2010, (Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise Johnson, eds., 2011), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/int_investment_law_and_sd_key_cases_2010.pdf. 
35
 Susan Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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Not surprisingly, these next-generation disputes, unlike their humdrum 
contract-based predecessors, have attracted significant public attention.  
Domestic and transnational constituencies who stand to benefit from 
governmental regulatory measures – including organized labor, 
environmental lobbies, and human rights advocates – now routinely decry 
the international investment law regime as undemocratic, imbalanced, and 
biased in favor of foreign investors over other important social groups.
36
  
They have begun mobilizing against the regime in sophisticated ways.  
Prominent NGOs founded in the mid-1990s out of concern that the WTO 
would negatively impact upon public interest issues are now devoting 
sizeable portions of their budgets to lobbying for reforms to the 
international investment law regime instead. 
Against this whirlwind backdrop, it is no surprise that practitioners, 
arbitrators, scholars, and others have only recently begun debating the 
appropriate role of international investment law in protecting “public” 
versus “private” rights and interests within the global economy.37  Much 
of the scholarly discourse characterizes the debate itself as a “backlash” 
against international investment law.
38
  Some observers wonder whether 
the modern system of international investment law is on the verge of 
collapse.
39
  Others actively call for the system’s abolition.40   Still others 
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., Institute for Policy Studies and Food and Water Watch, Challenging 
Corporate Investor Rule: How the World Bank’s Investment Court, Free Trade 
Agreements, and Bilateral Investment Treaties have Unleashed a New Era of Corporate 
Power and What to Do About It, (by Sarah Anderson and Sara Grusky, April 2007); 
Canada’s Coalition to End Poverty, Making a Bad Situation Worse: An Analysis of the 
Text of the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: In particular the Investment 
Chapter in the Canada-Colombia FTA, (by Scott Sinclair, 2009); International Institute 
for Sustainable Development and World Wildlife Fund, Private Rights, Public Problems: 
A Guide to NAFTA’s Controversial Chapter on Investor Rights (2001); Press Release, 
Seattle to Brussels Network, Member States Put Corporate Rights over Public Interests in 
EU Investment Policy, (Oct. 25, 2010) available at 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/S2B_press_release_Council_co
nclusions_101025.pdf. 
37
 Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s 
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit? 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008); William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, Private 
Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 
35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283 (2010); Amanda L. Norris and Katina E. Metzidakis, Public 
Protests, Private Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba 
Water War, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 31 (2010); Noemi Gal-Or, Dispute Resolution in 
International Trade and Investment Law: Privatisation of the Public?, in 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS LIMITS (Jean-Christophe Graz & 
Andreas Nölke eds., 2008). 
38
 THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, 
(Michael Waibel, ed. 2010). 
39
 Christoph Schreuer, The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, 17 (Working Paper, 
delivered in Frankfurt on 26 Apr. 26, 2006),(“So is investor-state arbitration in danger?  
The answer is probably: not yet but we should not necessarily take it for granted.  There 
 
Integrated Systems Approach to Int. Inv. Law 11 
 
prefer to view recent developments as growing pains – a temporary 
“legitimacy crisis” engendered by the novelty (but not necessarily 
undesirability) of arbitrating public interest issues within a private dispute 
settlement framework.
41
  Reasonable minds may well disagree, it seems.  
More to the point, we should expect them do so when they have only 
recently begun working through a largely unexpected set of problems.  
B. Structural peculiarities 
If historical happenstance helps explain why scholarly consideration of 
the regime is still in its early stages, international investment law’s 
structural peculiarities may explain why the nascent debate has so far 
centered on trying to pin down the system’s public versus private nature.  
Several commentators have examined the regime’s unusual structural 
features at length.
42
  I survey them only briefly here, focusing specifically 
on four features that seem to underpin the belief that international 
investment law sets up a novel kind of tension between public and private 
rights not otherwise seen in other areas of international law.   
1. The sweeping global coverage of investment instruments 
Numerous international legal regimes are global in scope.  The 
investment law regime is unusual, however, in that its coverage is 
technically patchy but functionally sweeping.  This is because 
international investment law encompasses a vast number of interwoven 
legal instruments protecting foreign investors and their investments.  
These come in three basic types:  international investment treaties, 
investor-state contracts, and domestic investment statutes.  Foreign 
investors can benefit from multiple types of protection simultaneously, 
and where one type of protection is unavailable, a diligent investor can 
                                                                                                                         
may well be further curtailments or even calls to replace the current system by a State v. 
State system.”), available at www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_86.pdf. 
40
 See Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE HALL LAW 
SCHOOL (Aug. 31, 2010) (public statement in which 50 academics expressed that “[t]here 
is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment 
treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration”), available at 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/.  
41
 Charles N. Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 7, 2002); Ari Afilalo, 
Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels 
Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L L. REV. 51 (2004); Susan 
Frank, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).  I 
note that the “legitimacy crisis” discussion is not unique to international investment law.  
See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003) (arguing 
that the reconfiguration of authority in the global political economy portends a “crisis of 
legitimacy” for international law more broadly). 
42
 See especially VAN HARTEN and SCHNEIDERMAN, both supra note 11. 
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usually find a way to obtain one or more of the other types.  One 
possibility is for an investor who wishes to invest in a country with which 
its home country does not maintain an investment treaty to route its 
investment through a third country.  This is why Philip Morris, a U.S. 
incorporated company, brought its dispute against Australia through its 
Hong Kong subsidiary (thereby taking advantage of the Australia-Hong 
Kong BIT.)
43
  With more than 3000 bilateral and regional investment 
treaties now in existence,
44
 it is often possible to structure investments in 
such a way as to bring them within the ambit of at least one investment 
treaty.  The inclusion of most-favored nation clauses in most treaties then 
enables investors to claim the benefit of the highest level of protection 
offered by a state under any of its other treaties.   
Even in the case of the few countries that remain outside the 
investment treaty system (most notably Brazil), an investor with sufficient 
market clout can often persuade the host state to agree to an investor-state 
contract offering similar protections.
45
  The upshot of all of this is that, 
although 100 years’ worth of efforts by treaty negotiators have failed to 
generate a multilateral agreement on investment,
46
 international 
investment law has nevertheless effectively gone global.
47
  This makes the 
regime’s actual or potential impact upon public policy and the public 
interest a matter of global significance. 
2. The broad and evolving notion of “investment” 
Most international legal instruments exposing states to direct financial 
liability are narrowly drafted.  For example, there are thousands of pages 
of WTO country schedules listing the specific tariff lines in respect of 
which countries have agreed to be bound.  Not so with most existing 
investment treaties. The majority of contemporary investment treaties 
protect, as illustrated by the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, “every asset that an 
                                                 
43
 In Philip Morris’ case, this routing may have been done too late, which could cause 
problems for the company’s claim at the jurisdictional phase.  But when done prior to the 
onset of any dispute, “treaty shopping” is generally accepted by arbitral tribunals as a 
valid form of investment planning. 
44
 UNCTAD – WIR 2013, supra note 27, at 101. 
45
 Because most contract-based disputes remain confidential, it is impossible to know 
whether the outcomes of contract-based disputes differ substantially from treaty-based 
disputes arising out of the same sets of facts and circumstances.  For a conceptual 
discussion of the potential parallels between the two types of disputes, see infra, notes 
168–170 and accompanying text.  For a sociological account of the international 
commercial arbitration world, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN 
VIRTUE (1996). 
46
 For a catalog of the multiple failed attempts, see VAN HARTEN, supra note 11 at pp. 
18–23. 
47
 See generally STEPHAN SCHILL, THE MULITLATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (2009). 
Integrated Systems Approach to Int. Inv. Law 13 
 
investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly”. 48   This includes, in 
particular, but not exclusively:  stocks, bonds, debentures, claims to 
money, tangible and intangible property, intellectual property, contract 
rights, and more.
49
  The standard definition is broad enough to encompass 
not only so-called “greenfield” investments but also cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions and, unless explicitly excluded, portfolio investments.
50
   
When combined with the fact that most investment treaties protect 
both natural and juridical persons as investors, this can lead to some 
surprising results: host state nationals can sometimes bring international 
arbitration claims against their own governments simply by incorporating 
a shell company abroad;
51
 shareholders who would have no derivative 
cause of action under domestic law for a drop in share value brought about 
by a generally applicable regulatory measure can claim compensation 
from the state under international law;
52
 foreign investments can benefit 
from broad international legal protections irrespective of whether they 
contribute anything of lasting value to the host state or its economy;
53
 and 
now, after a 2011 jurisdictional decision that went against Argentina,
54
 
foreign speculators in sovereign bond markets may enjoy special 
guarantees against sovereign default while domestic bondholders (and 
non-covered foreign bondholders) must accept “haircuts” in the form of 
debt restructuring deals. 
                                                 
48
 U.S. Model BIT 2012, supra note 21, at art. 1. 
49
 Id. arts. 1(a)–(h). 
50
 Both majority and minority shareholdings have been found to fall within the scope of 
investment treaty protections, even where the investor does not hold significant voting or 
control rights. 
51
 See, e.g. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 1–4, 14–71 (Apr. 29, 2004), 20 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 205 
(2005); (finding that a Lithuanian company could bring treaty claims against Ukraine, 
despite the fact that the company was incorporated by Ukrainian nationals using funds 
imported from Ukraine to Lithuania); but see Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion [of Prosper Weil] (Apr. 29, 2004), 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 
245 (2005) (reaching opposite conclusion) and TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award (Dec. 19, 2008) (departing from 
the Tokios Tokelés approach, though the dissenting arbitrator embraced it).  Some 
treaties, like the Energy Charter Treaty, contain provisions which prohibit domestic 
investors from doing this kind of end-run around their own domestic court systems, but 
many other treaties do not. 
52
 Argentina has raised this point as a jurisdictional objection in two-dozen of the claims 
arising out of its 2001 financial crisis.  It has lost the objection each time.  See Daimler 
Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Daimler], ¶ 91. 
53
 The Salini tribunal famously read an “economic contribution” requirement into the 
ICSID Convention, but the validity of this move has been disputed, and many tribunals 
have declined to follow suit. See Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Award, ¶ 52 (Jul. 23, 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003).  
54
 Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility (Aug. 4 2011),[hereinafter Abaclat – Jurisdiction]. 
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From a business perspective, it makes perfect sense to treat all forms 
of business participation the same.  All are essentially profit-seeking 
activities, and the decision to pursue one over the others is often made for 
pragmatic reasons.  But if investments need not be truly foreign, nor direct, 
nor even “investments” in the classical sense of these words55 in order to 
qualify for special protections under contemporary investment treaties, 
then it becomes difficult to justify the regime under the traditional 
explanation that it promotes the economic development of host states by 
encouraging foreign direct investment inflows.  This difficulty is 
propounded by the fact that the empirical literature is beginning to make 
the investment treaty bargain, in particular, look rather one-sided.  
Empiricists have so far found little evidence to suggest that investment 
treaties increase investment flows to the countries that sign them, nor that 
they reduce political risk insurance premiums for investors.
56
  By contrast, 
there is ample evidence – in the form of numerous damages awards – that 
the treaties can impose significant costs on host states.
57
  This empirical 
lopsidedness supplies yet another reason for the growing perception that 
international investment law privileges “private” investor rights over all 
other “public” interests.58 
3. Vague treaty standards and the elision of rights and interests 
A third reason for the perceived imbalance between private and public 
rights is that states’ legal obligations toward foreign investors under 
international investment treaties are notoriously vague. They are drafted in 
the form of broad standards rather than precise obligations.  While there 
are minor differences in wording across treaties, most of them obligate 
states to do six basic things:  provide fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security to the foreign investment; guarantee the free 
transferability of the investment and its associated returns; treat foreign 
investors at least as favorably as the State’s own investors (national 
                                                 
55
 Since some – like sovereign bonds – may be of an entirely speculative nature, capable 
of being bought and then sold on an international exchange within a span of minutes. 
56
 See Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct 
Investment?  Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) 
(summarizing the existing empirical literature which shows investment treaties do not 
produce increases in investment inflows, and finding additionally that investment treaties 
do not seem to factor into the decision-making processes of company executives when 
deciding whether to undertake foreign investments nor of risk insurers when calculating 
premiums for political risk insurance policies. 
57
 Of course, there are just as many cases wherein investors receive no compensation.  
(See supra note 35.)  But this does not satisfy critics who would like to see a 
demonstrable benefit to host states that is of a sufficient scale to offset the damages paid 
out in the 50% (on average) of claims lost. 
58
 I discuss some possible alternative justifications for the regime in part III.C. infra.  
Unfortunately, none of these has yet been empirically tested, and data limitations may 
well prevent their theoretical benefits from ever being conclusively demonstrated. 
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treatment) and the investors of any third state (most-favored nation 
treatment); and not to expropriate the investment except for a public 
purpose, in accordance with due process, and against prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation – generally interpreted as requiring 
compensation at fair market value.   
All of these obligations sound quite reasonable in the abstract.  The 
difficulty lies in applying them consistently across diverse factual and 
legal contexts.  There are at least three components to the problem.  First 
and foremost is the ambiguity of the textual provisions themselves.  What 
is an expropriation, exactly?  Does it cover only physical confiscations of 
property or also other types of measures having a confiscatory effect?  Can 
a substantial diminution in the value of a property brought about by a 
government regulatory measure amount to an indirect expropriation?
59
  
Can a series of small measures, like progressive tax increases, add up to a 
“creeping expropriation?” 60   The fair and equitable treatment standard 
leaves even more room for interpretation.  What does it mean for a 
government action to be fair and equitable?  Fair to whom, and in what 
sense?  Equitable in relation to which standard of reference?  Should one 
look to domestic law, customary practice, the investor’s subjective 
expectations, or the arbitrator’s own personal sense of fairness? 61 
This latter set of questions points to the second aspect of the vague 
standards problem:  they are interpreted on a case by case basis by 
arbitrators hailing from different backgrounds, each of whom at some 
level imbues the words of the treaty
62
 with meaning derived from his or 
her own experience.
63
  A U.S. trained arbitrator may implicitly read ideas 
drawn from the American regulatory takings jurisprudence into an 
expropriation analysis, while a French arbitrator may read-in French and 
perhaps also European law understandings.
64
  Small wonder, then, that the 
                                                 
59
 In U.S. parlance, a regulatory taking. 
60
 For a discussion of these questions, see RUDOLF DOLZER AND CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2008), pp. 89-118. 
61
 The NAFTA member countries attempted, in 2001, to bring some clarity to NAFTA 
chapter 11’s fair and equitable treatment standard by issuing an interpretive note 
specifying that this standard was meant to reflect the minimum standard of treatment 
found in customary international law.  See Notes of Interpretation of Certain NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade Commission (July 31, 2001), part 2, available 
at: http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA_Comm_1105_Transparency.pdf.  The 
utility of this clarification remains disputed, however, since the content of the customary 
law standard is itself a matter of longstanding debate.  See DOLZER AND SCHREUER, supra 
note 60, pp. 119-32. 
62
 Or contract or statute, as the case may be. 
63
 I do not suggest that arbitrators intentionally impart nationalistic interpretations upon 
treaty provisions, only that it is human nature to make sense of new information by 
reference to an existing knowledge base. 
64
 For an extensive discussion of the relationship between arbitrator appointment 
practices and outcomes, as well as the impact of arbitrator characteristics upon decision-
making trends, see Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? (Working 
Paper) (on file with author) (finding that investment arbitrators are more lenient to host 
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same treaty standards are sometimes interpreted by different arbitral 
tribunals in diametrically opposed ways.
65
 
     Third, the textual ambiguities pose quandaries concerning the very 
nature of investment disciplines.  Are investors rights-holders under 
investment treaties (since they can lodge claims against host states for 
violations of treaty obligations)?  Or are they mere third party 
beneficiaries who hold a derivative interest in states’ observance of their 
reciprocal legal obligations (since the investors themselves are not parties 
to the treaty)?
66
   
The treaty standards are so vague that it’s difficult to distinguish 
between rights and interests.  Perhaps this explains why arbitral tribunals 
have tended to elide the two.  The fair and equitable treatment standard, 
for example, has been interpreted as requiring states to protect the 
legitimate, investment backed expectations of investors concerning their 
investments.
67
  Do investors then have a right to, or merely an interest in, 
the protection of their legitimate expectations?  Since the concrete 
components of vague treaty standards are articulated by arbitrators rather 
than by treaty drafters, it seems strange to call those components rights.  
But if investors can obtain compensation when states act in ways that 
contravene their expectations, then the academic distinction between 
rights and interests becomes moot in any event.  The ambiguity of the 
legal obligations creates an environment wherein investor perceptions 
seem to matter more than legal doctrine.
68
  This again fuels the concern 
that the regime favors private investor rights over competing public 
interest concerns. 
                                                                                                                         
countries from their own legal family, and that other aspects of arbitrator experience and 
training also play an important role in investment arbitration decisions, even after 
controlling for industry fixed effects and country characteristics). 
65
 Franck refers to this as “privatizing public international law through inconsistent 
decisions.”  Franck, supra note 41.  For an analysis of inconsistent interpretations of 
most-favored nation clauses, see Julie A. Maupin, MFN-based Jurisdiction in Investor-
State Disputes: Is There any Hope for a Consistent Approach?, 14(1) J. INT’L ECON. L. 
157 (2011). 
66
 For a discussion of this debate, see Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in 
Investment Treaty Interpretation: the Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 184-5 
(2010). 
67
 See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 152–74  (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 158 (2004) 
(discussing fair and equitable treatment and legitimate expectations).  Numerous 
subsequent tribunals have adopted the same approach.  For criticism of this approach, see 
Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, Separate 
Opinion of Pedro Nikken, ¶¶ 2-3, 22-27 (July 30, 2010) (objecting to what he regards as 
the arbitral invention of the legitimate expectations and stability and predictability 
doctrines within fair and equitable treatment analysis) [hereinafter Suez – Dissenting 
Opinion]. 
68
 For an arbitral refutation of the tendency to accept investor perceptions as law, see 
Daimler, supra note 52 at ¶ 246. 
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4. Extra-democratic dispute settlement 
Where the rubber really hits the road, however, in terms of the 
investment regime’s public versus private debate, is in its peculiar brand 
of investor-state dispute settlement.  After all, legal challenges to 
governmental regulatory activities are hardly a new phenomenon.  What 
makes them novel in the international investment law context is the fact 
that they are decided entirely outside of the constitutional framework of 
the state engaging in the regulation.  The individuals who decide investor-
state disputes are private arbitrators who – for reasons having to do with 
the perception of neutrality – do not hail from the state concerned.  They 
are not subject to any kind of domestic democratic control.  They are, by 
design, strangers to the legal, political, social, and cultural traditions of the 
state whose actions they are evaluating.   
In most cases, two of the three arbitrators are appointed by the 
disputing parties themselves – one by the investor and one by the 
respondent state.  The presiding arbitrator is then appointed either by 
agreement of the parties or their appointed arbitrators or, more commonly, 
by a designated institutional appointing authority from one of the major 
arbitration institutions.
69
  This arrangement leads to predictably strategic 
appointment behaviors.  The investor-claimant appoints an arbitrator 
either believed to be generally pro-investor or known to favor the 
arguments the investor intends to bring in the particular dispute.  The 
respondent state does likewise, appointing the arbitrator it believes most 
likely to absolve it of any financial liability.  And while party-appointed 
arbitrators do not always fulfill the expectations of their appointing parties, 
they appear to do so with sufficient frequency to fuel concerns that the 
system is biased by design.
70
   
Some critics contend that a systemic bias extends to presiding 
arbitrators as well – the crucial swing vote in many cases.  The argument 
is that, because all three arbitrators are paid by the disputing parties, and 
only investors (not states) can initiate arbitration proceedings, presiding 
arbitrators who wish to safeguard the possibility of future investor-state 
arbitration appointments have an incentive to ensure that investors win 
                                                 
69
 The arbitration-related institutions that play the biggest role in investor-state disputes 
include ICSID, the Permanent Court of Arbitration [hereinafter PCA], the International 
Chamber of Commerce [hereinafter ICC], the London Court of International Arbitration 
[hereinafter LCIA], the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce [hereinafter the SCC] and 
UNCITRAL.  The first five all offer institutional administration of investor-state disputes, 
while the last is an inter-governmental body that promulgates a set of procedural rules 
(commonly referred to as the UNICTRAL arbitration rules) that are used in most “ad hoc” 
(meaning not institutionally administered) investor-state arbitrations. 
70
 Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in 
Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN, ch. 42 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al., eds., 2011) (finding 
that dissenting opinions almost always favor the party who appointed the dissenter).  See 
also the collected papers in Arbitrator Bias, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT SPECIAL (2008). 
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with some frequency.
71
  I have reservations as to the accuracy of such 
incentive arguments.
72
  Nevertheless, when one adds to the suggestion of 
biased decision-making the facts that:  1) investor-state disputes may 
impact upon matters of concern to persons who are not before the tribunal, 
2) the decisions of investment arbitrators are generally not reviewable in 
domestic courts,
73
 and 3) the monetary awards issued by investor-state 
tribunals are often directly enforceable through the attachment of state-
owned resources in dozens of countries around the world,
74
 it becomes 
easy to see why the regime is described as suffering from a legitimacy 
crisis.
75
   
 What is not so obvious, however, is how conceiving of the regime as 
either a transnational public regulatory system or, alternatively, a private 
dispute settlement system does anything to resolve the crisis.  But before 
turning to this quandary, it is necessary to fill in one more missing piece of 
the puzzle.  What kinds of public/private dilemmas have actually arisen in 
investor-state disputes, and why we should care about them?  The next 
section answers these questions by reference to three specific case studies. 
                                                 
71
 For an argument along these lines, see Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, (Michael 
Waibel et al, eds., 2010), ch. 9.     
72
 I find the arbitrator self-interest argument deficient on at least two fronts.  First, to the 
extent that party-appointed arbitrators tend to find in favor of their appointing parties, it 
seems more likely that this may happen because the appointing parties did a good job of 
vetting the arbitrators’ proclivities in advance (viewpoint bias) rather than because 
arbitrators are strategically angling to procure a stream of future appointments (incentive 
bias).  Second, the self-interest argument is rather complicated as applied to presiding 
arbitrators.  Even assuming such arbitrators wish to maximize their own personal 
reappointment prospects, it is not clear that this would be accomplished by favoring 
claimants over states, since the overall survival of the regime depends upon continued 
state support.  In a more recent article, Van Harten has backed away from the more 
generalized bias argument, instead suggesting that there is some tentative empirical 
evidence of a systemic bias in favor of “claimants in general and claimants from major 
Western capital-exporting states in particular.”  Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in 
Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. (forthcoming 2013), p. 6 available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2149207 [hereinafter Van Harten – 
Arbitrator Behaviour].  To my knowledge, this more limited claim has not yet been either 
replicated or refuted. 
73
 Except on the very limited grounds set out under article 52 of the ICSID Convention or 
in some cases under article V of the New York Convention, both supra note 22.   
74
 Sovereign immunity doctrines render some assets easier to attach than others. 
75
 See references cited supra note 41. 
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C. What’s really at stake?  Three examples of public/private clashes 
1. A private concession in public infrastructure services: Suez et al v. 
Argentina
76
 
In 1993, Argentina privatized the water distribution and wastewater 
treatment services for the city of Buenos Aires, an area comprising some 
eight million inhabitants.  A consortium of European companies (the 
investors/claimants) bid upon and won the 30-year concession contract.   
Unfortunately, by 2000, Argentina began to experience serious financial 
difficulties.  Faced with massive strikes, riots, runs on the banks, and the 
ouster of five presidents in ten days, Argentina abandoned the dollar-peso 
convertibility law which had been the primary guarantor of the 
concession’s profitability.  The concession contract entitled the investors 
to pass the resulting 70% depreciation of the peso along to Buenos Aires’ 
water consumers.  As this would have tripled the price of water and 
rendered it unaffordable to large swaths of the population in the midst of 
an economic crisis, however, the Argentine government froze the tariffs of 
all public service utilities and announced the mandatory renegotiation of 
the concessions.  
Dissatisfied with the progress of the renegotiation efforts, the 
European investors filed an investor-state arbitration claim against 
Argentina under that country’s bilateral investment treaties with Spain, 
France, and the United Kingdom.  The investors claimed that Argentina 
had, by its emergency measures, expropriated their investment, subjected 
it to unfair and inequitable treatment, and failed to provide it with full 
protection and security as required under the treaties. They sought 
compensation for the full market value of the investment as it stood prior 
to Argentina’s abrogation of the dollar-peso convertibility law, to include 
23 years’ worth of lost profits calculated at the investment’s pre-crisis 
profitability level.   
Argentina defended the suit on the grounds that it had acted out of 
economic necessity and a duty to protect its population and that it had no 
reasonable alternative under the circumstances.  Several human rights 
organizations and consumer advocacy groups filed a joint amicus brief 
urging the tribunal to take into account Argentina’s international legal 
obligations – under several human rights treaties – to ensure uninterrupted 
access to safe drinking water.  The majority of the tribunal paid no heed to 
either set of public-regarding arguments, however.  In an award on 
liability issued in 2010, the majority of the arbitral tribunal found that 
Argentina had violated the treaties’ fair and equitable treatment standard 
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by frustrating the investors’ legitimate expectations concerning the 
investment.  It did not find the health or human rights implications of 
allowing the investors to implement the contractually permitted three-fold 
price hike in the midst of an economic crisis to be relevant to its decision.  
The tribunal’s determination on damages is still pending, though it is 
expected to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
77
 
The Suez dispute exhibits several features which are typical of many 
modern-day investor-state arbitration claims.  A large number of foreign 
direct investments are made in sectors which provide essential services to 
the general public.  According to figures from the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes:  six percent of all registered ICSID 
disputes have involved water, sanitation, or flood protection; 13% electric 
power and energy; 11% transportation; five percent agriculture, fishing 
and forestry; and 25% oil, gas, and mining.
78
 
2. Private financing of public debt: Abaclat v. Argentina79 
Public interest in international investment disputes is not always 
confined to specific public-service industries or natural resource sectors.  
Sometimes the public dimensions of disputes are more general in nature.  
The ongoing Abaclat matter, another of the many claims to arise out of the 
Argentine financial crisis, illustrates this point nicely.  Abaclat concerns 
the rescheduling of sovereign debt.  After Argentina defaulted on some 
$100 billion in external debt in December of 2001, eight major Italian 
banks formed an association to “represent the interests of the Italian 
bondholders in pursuing a negotiated settlement with Argentina.”80  This 
association declined to participate in the debt restructuring deal that was 
offered by Argentina and accepted by the majority of its creditors in 2005.  
Instead, it launched the first ever mass investor-state arbitration claim.  
The claim was brought by the Italian association under the Italy-Argentina 
bilateral investment treaty on behalf of 180,000 Italian holders of defunct 
Argentine bonds. 
Argentina strongly objected to the registration of the dispute, arguing 
that sovereign bonds sold on international exchanges are not foreign direct 
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 The size of the investors’ claim is not yet a matter of public record.  But see Azurix 
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 442 (July 14, 2006), 
3 ILM 262 (2004) (awarding investors in similar water concession located in a smaller 
province a concession of $US 165.2 million plus interest); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, p. 139, ¶ 2 (May 12, 2005), 44 
ILM 1205 (2005) (awarding investors in gas distribution a concession of $US 133.2 
million plus interest). 
78
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 Abaclat – Jurisdiction, supra note 54. 
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investments for purposes of the ICSID Convention and that the Argentina-
Italy bilateral investment treaty did not contemplate the possibility of mass 
arbitration claims.  Two-thirds of the initial claimants withdrew or settled 
their claims during the jurisdictional tug of war that ensued.  But in 
August of 2011, a majority of the arbitral tribunal held that it had 
jurisdiction to entertain the mass action by the remaining 60,000 claimants 
and that it would proceed to hear the merits of the dispute.
81
 
The timing of the decision could not have been more momentous.  
With the Eurozone in full crisis-management mode and the Greek debt 
restructuring process already underway, disgruntled investors the world 
over began to consider whether it might be possible to bring similar mass 
claims against Greece
82
 and perhaps – in the event of an eventual default – 
against Portugal, Spain, and Italy as well.   
It remains to be seen what will happen with the Abaclat claim on the 
merits.  Even so, the mere possibility that foreign bondholders might be 
able to sue for the full par value of defunct sovereign bonds in an investor-
state arbitration setting raises important public policy questions.  Will 
allowing such claims encourage holdouts and make future sovereign debt 
restructurings impossible?  If so, what options will be left to heavily 
indebted countries seeking to recover from crisis episodes?  And if 
national governments can be sued for sovereign default, why not 
subnational governmental units like states and municipalities?  
International investment agreements typically hold national governments 
financially liable for any violations committed by their constituent sub-
entities.
83
  This is noteworthy, since there is increasing evidence that many 
sub-federal U.S. entities in particular may be carrying large and 
unsustainable debt burdens.
84
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 Arbitrator Georges Abi-Saab, a prominent public international lawyer and former 
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What the Abaclat case makes clear, therefore, is that international 
investment law may have important implications for how governments go 
about raising funds and dealing with liquidity crunches.  Here it is not 
simply the public impact of a foreign investment in a particular public 
service industry that is at issue.  It is the government fisc as a whole that is 
affected. 
3. Private property in public health hazards: Philip Morris v. 
Australia 
85
  
Philip Morris’s pending claim against Australia underscores that 
financially volatile developing country governments are by no means the 
only ones to face investor-state claims whose ramifications can extend 
beyond the disputing parties themselves. In November of 2011, the 
Australian parliament approved the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (TPP 
Act).  The Act attempts to “reduc[e] the attractiveness and appeal of 
tobacco products to consumers”86 by “prohibit[ing] the use of trade marks, 
symbols, graphics or images on or in relation to tobacco products and 
packaging.” 87  Philip Morris responded to the new Australian legislation 
by filing an investment treaty claim against Australia through its 
subsidiary, Philip Morris Asia Limited, a Hong Kong company.
88
  It 
brought the claim under the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between 
Australia and Hong Kong.   
In its notice of arbitration, Philip Morris has alleged that Australia’s 
prohibition on the display of tobacco-related trademarks has expropriated 
the value of its shares by “destroy[ing] the commercial value of the 
[company’s] intellectual property and goodwill”89 and “undermin[ing] the 
economic rationale of the investments”.90  It further claims that the Act 
violates the treaty’s fair and equitable treatment guarantee by frustrating 
                                                                                                                         
debt-the-coming-crisis.html.  For examples of proposed solutions to the state problem 
that could be thwarted in the event of an investment treaty claim, see Steven L. Schwarz, 
A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA LAW REV. 322 (2011); and 
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85
 See Philip Morris – Notice of Arbitration, supra note 6; compare Philip Morris Asia 
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 Philip Morris – Response to Notice of Arbitration, supra note 67, ¶ 25 (quoting a 
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the company’s legitimate interests and expectations concerning the 
profitability of its investment. By way of remedy, the company asks the 
arbitral tribunal to order Australia to suspend the enforcement of the plain 
packaging legislation
91
 or, in the alternative, to pay Philip Morris 
compensatory damages for the lost value of its investment “in an amount 
to be quantified but of the order of billions of Australian dollars.” 92  
Uruguay is facing a similar claim by Philip Morris,
93
 and the company has 
threatened parallel suits against other countries that are debating the merits 
of plain packaging legislation.   
These cases test the degree to which international investment law may 
limit the scope – or raise the price – of a sovereign’s right to regulate in 
the interests of the public.  In civil society discourse, this question has 
become known as the regulatory chill problem.  
The basic idea motivating this concern is straightforward.  As 
scientific research advances over time and social attitudes evolve, public 
policy must adapt.  This is as true of public health policy as it is of 
environmental preservation, financial regulation, and just about every 
other conceivable area of governmental regulation.  Yet if investment 
treaties are interpreted as requiring governments to pay compensation to 
foreign investors whenever general welfare-enhancing regulatory activities 
somehow reduce investor profits, then governments will be hesitant to 
regulate in the public interest.  In some cases, where the price is too high 
and the government budget too small, governments may even find 
themselves financially incapable of doing so. 
Fears about regulatory chill are understandable in light of the fact that 
investor-state disputes often involve high stakes.
94
   The Big Tobacco 
disputes are multi-billion dollar claims, as is the recent claim by Swedish 
energy company Vattenfall against Germany.
95
  Of course, investors don’t 
always win these challenges, and even when they do, they rarely recover 
the full amount of their claims.
96
  Still, the financial implications for states 
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can be significant.  The Czech Republic lost an infamous dispute over 
media licensing that resulted in it having to pay out $355 million to a 
foreign investor.
97
  This amounted to the equivalent of its national 
healthcare budget for that year.
98
  Argentina has faced 41 investor-state 
claims as a result of its 2001 financial crisis,
99
 the sum total of which at 
one point exceeded the country’s gross domestic product.  Greece and 
other struggling Eurozone countries may soon find themselves in a similar 
position.
100
  Returning to Philip Morris, the Marlboro brand alone has an 
estimated worldwide value of $73.6 billion.
101
  This surpasses the annual 
GDP of all but the top 18 richest countries in the world.
102
   
Does all of this mean that international investment law makes each 
state’s ability to regulate harmful activities a function of the state’s overall 
economic power relative to the strength of a given foreign investor’s 
market power?  If so, might large companies operating in small countries 
effectively enjoy an internationally protected right to pollute?   To frack?  
To strip-mine?  To deforest?  To sell hazardous consumer products? 
Despite the eye-popping numbers and troubling questions – or perhaps 
because of them – the regulatory chill hypothesis has been hotly debated 
within the investment arbitration community.  Some claim there is no 
evidence of any kind of chill actually occurring in practice, while others 
insist they can point to specific instances where governments have 
declined to take particular regulatory measures for fear of being hit by an 
investor-state arbitration claim.
103
  These assertions deserve to be 
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investigated from an empirical perspective.  For now, what is not subject 
to debate is this:  in the present Philip Morris dispute, three privately 
appointed, non-Australian arbitrators will decide what price Australia 
must pay, if any, for its most recent effort to reduce the public health 
scourge of cigarette smoking.
104
 
D. Categorical accounts:  private dispute settlement or public governance? 
The Suez, Abaclat, and Philip Morris case studies and the foregoing 
discussion of international investment law’s structural peculiarities have 
shown that the stakes are high in this game.  They have also revealed an 
undeniable, intuitive appeal behind the impulse to discuss the regime’s 
makeup in public/private terms.  The trouble with grounding a normative 
debate upon intuition, of course, is that it is notoriously fickle.  What a 
foreign investor regards as quite evidently a private issue – and the 
personal value that s/he consequently attaches to that fact – may differ 
quite dramatically from what a state or its citizens might consider to be 
private about that particular investor’s investment activities.  Much 
depends upon one’s point of view.105   
Nevertheless, the bulk of the contemporary discourse in international 
investment law can be divided into two camps: the private dispute 
settlement camp and the public regulatory regime camp.  Anthea Roberts 
has described the battle between the two camps as a clash of paradigms.
106
  
This seems correct as a descriptive matter, but it tells us little about 
whether one paradigm better reflects the interests of the regime’s 
stakeholders or whether there is reason to believe that one does a better 
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job of resolving conflict of rights problems than the other.
107
  In order to 
consider these questions, a few words about the two main scholarly 
perspectives are in order. 
1. Private dispute settlement framing 
The private dispute settlement camp is comprised of those who 
analogize international investment law to transnational commercial law 
and regard it as having little or no public impact.  They view host states’ 
investment law obligations to foreign investors as akin to private 
contractual commitments and view investor-state arbitration (whether 
conducted under treaties, contracts, or statutes) as an extension of ordinary 
commercial arbitration.  This perspective emanates primarily from 
practitioners and scholars of international commercial arbitration.
108
  It 
remains underdeveloped as a theoretical account of the international 
investment law regime,
109
 yet it dominates much of the investor-state 
arbitral jurisprudence.   
The popularity of the approach often puzzles outsiders, but its appeal 
becomes clearer when one considers three facts.  First, the process by 
which investor-state disputes are decided is modeled on international 
commercial arbitration.
110
  Second, around two-thirds of known 
investment arbitrators hail from a commercial arbitration background.
111
  
And third, in the latter half of the 20
th
 century, the vast majority of 
investor-state disputes involved claims for breach of contract, which for 
all intents and purposes looked very much like ordinary commercial 
disputes.
112
  The private dispute settlement model functions quite well in 
such circumstances, so it is no surprise that arbitrators from commercial 
law backgrounds became the go-to appointees for resolving these disputes. 
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 See supra, note 24 and accompanying text. 
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Serious complications arise, however, in transferring the private 
dispute settlement mindset from the contract-based world to the treaty-
based world.  In contract-based arbitrations, the goal of the tribunal is to 
hold the contracting parties accountable to their reciprocal contractual 
commitments by requiring the breaching party to make the other party 
whole – typically by payment of compensation.  This objective respects 
the principle of party autonomy inasmuch as the disputing parties before 
the tribunal are the contracting parties themselves.  A cardinal corollary 
here is that the arbitral tribunal must limit itself to deciding the issues in 
dispute between the contracting parties on the basis of the contract.  Its 
award is not permitted to impact upon the rights of any parties who are not 
before the tribunal.
113
   
In treaty-based arbitrations, by contrast, only one of the disputing 
parties – the respondent State – is a contracting party to the treaty.  The 
other contracting party (the investor’s home State) is not before the 
tribunal, and its views on the proper interpretation of the treaty are often 
not known.
114
  There are no reciprocal obligations between the disputing 
parties to which the tribunal can hold them mutually accountable, since 
investment treaties bestow obligations only upon states, not upon investors.  
Moreover, the open-textured nature of treaty provisions like “fair and 
equitable treatment” stands in contradistinction to the specificity of most 
contractual obligations.  This, in turn, increases the chance that a tribunal’s 
interpretation and application of a vague treaty provision may 
inadvertently impact upon the rights of persons not before the tribunal. 
Adherents of the private dispute settlement paradigm do not take 
sufficient account of these three major differences between contract-based 
and treaty-based disputes.  Rather, they tend to deal with the appearance of 
public interest issues within international investment disputes in one of 
two ways.  The first method is to hide behind the smokescreen of limited 
jurisdiction.
115
  For example, a tribunal may claim that it has no 
jurisdiction to consider a human rights argument in relation to an alleged 
investment treaty violation, because to do so would constitute an excès de 
pouvoir.
116
   I label this method a smokescreen because it raises a 
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conundrum well-known to followers of the ongoing fragmentation debate 
within international law.
117
  That is, in the name of arbitral restraint, the 
tribunal asserts the power to undermine the state’s non-investment law-
based legal commitments by refusing to take them into account when 
interpreting the state’s investment-law-based legal commitments.  This 
effectively, even if unwittingly, aggrandizes investment law at the expense 
of other bodies of international and domestic law.
118
 
The second common method for handling conflicts between investor 
and non-investor rights within the private dispute settlement framing is by 
making conclusory findings of “no actual conflict”.  The above-described 
Suez case illustrates this method well.  There, the majority of the tribunal 
found that Argentina was required to respect the foreign-owned water 
company’s original concession terms notwithstanding the fact that the 
economic crisis had made the contractually stipulated water prices 
unaffordable to most citizens of Buenos Aires.  It found that there was no 
actual conflict (aka no conflict in law) between Argentina’s human rights 
obligation to ensure uninterrupted access to safe drinking water to its 
citizens and its investment law obligation to abide by the contract.  In the 
tribunal’s view, Argentina could have done both simultaneously by 
directly subsidizing the cost of the water service at the pre-crisis contract 
rate.
119
  What the tribunal declined to specify, however, was where 
Argentina might have found the money to do this in fact in the midst of 
the liquidity crisis.
120
  So applied, this second method becomes as much of 
a mirage as the first.   
                                                                                                                         
the legislation or the content of South Africa’s international human rights treaty 
commitments). 
117
 See generally, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13 2006) (by Martti Koskenniemi). 
118
 Remarkably, tribunals operating within this mindset often fail to consider other 
sources of law notwithstanding the fact that most investment treaties explicitly direct 
tribunals to apply not only the provisions of the investment treaty, but also the domestic 
law of the host state and any relevant rules of international law.  See, e.g. article 8(4) of 
the UK-Argentina BIT (one of the BITs upon which the Suez dispute was based), stating: 
The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement, the laws of the Contracting party 
involved in the dispute, including its rules on conflict of laws, the rules 
of any specific agreement concluded in relation to such an investment 
and the applicable principles of international law. 
119
 Suez – Award, supra note 76 ¶ 262 (“[u]nder the circumstances of these cases, 
Argentina’s human rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not 
inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive.  Thus, in the tribunal’s view, 
Argentina could have respected both types of obligations.”). 
120
 In making this observation, I do not suggest that the investor should have been forced 
to provide free water to the citizens of Buenos Aires.  However, had the dispute 
proceeded as a contractual matter rather than as a treaty matter, the tribunal would have 
had to consider whether the change of circumstances brought about by the devaluation of 
the peso called for a reduction in the originally specified contractual rate of return. 
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The shallowness of both interpretive methods helps explain why 
amicus curiae briefs have so far failed to make an appreciable impact on 
the outcome of investor-state disputes.  The private dispute settlement 
framing of the regime essentially ignores rather than resolves conflicts 
between the rights of the investor/claimant and the non-investment related 
rights of others.  The fact that this framework is nevertheless still applied 
in actual treaty-based investor-state disputes involving clear public interest 
concerns is testament to the strong normative pull of the regime’s 
historical commercial arbitration orientation. 
2. Transnational public governance regime framing 
On the opposite end of the debate are those who analogize 
international investment law to domestic administrative and/or 
constitutional law and regard it as a public governance regime operating 
on a transnational scale.  Gus van Harten laid the groundwork for this 
approach with his 2007 book, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public 
Law.
121
  In it, he argued that international investment arbitration is best 
viewed as a transnationalized form of “public law” in that it essentially 
reviews the validity of state regulatory actions in a manner reminiscent of 
domestic constitutional or administrative law orders.  A year later, David 
Schneiderman proffered a kindred analysis, arguing that international 
investment law was “constitutionalizing economic globalization”. 122  
Santiago Montt followed with a 2009 book presenting international 
investment law as a form of spontaneously emerging global administrative 
law.
123
  And most recently, Stephan Schill has been advancing the notion 
of international investment law as “comparative public law” 124  or 
“international public law”125 (not to be confused with public international 
law) – also stressing the regulatory review function of the regime.126 
Each of these works does an admirable job of highlighting the 
international investment law system’s key sources of regime stress.  Each 
points out the links between these stresses and similar problems found in 
domestic law – in particular the difficulties inherent in balancing 
individual rights and societal interests in the course of adjudication.
127
  
What is most striking about this strand of scholarship, however, given the 
remarkably similar way in which its authors conceive of the investment 
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 VAN HARTEN, supra note 11. 
122
 SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 11. 
123
 MONTT, supra note 11. 
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 Schill (ed) – IIL & COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 11. 
125
 Schill – New Public Law Approach, supra note 11. 
126
 For the most recent installment in the administrative law inspired angle, see Jason 
Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53(2) HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 391 (2012). 
127
 Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson provide an insightful analysis of the similarities 
between carrying out this task at the international and domestic levels in Law for States: 
International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). 
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law regime, is the vastly divergent set of prescriptive recommendations it 
generates in addressing the common problems identified.   
Van Harten proposes the creation of a standing judicial body, the 
“world businessman’s court”, to eliminate the incentive problems of party-
appointed arbitrators.  Schneiderman is more concerned about democratic 
accountability and therefore favors returning all investment disputes to the 
national courts.  Montt takes a two-fold approach, on the one hand urging 
that the system be given time to spontaneously converge upon a détente 
stasis through the operation of network effects while on the other hand 
urging arbitrators (along with Schill) to help the system along by 
anchoring their decisions in comparative administrative law reasoning. 
These solutions lie at very different points along the spectrum of 
possibilities, alternately proposing a complete scrapping, major re-design, 
or mild reform of the existing system.  Each solution has its merits and 
demerits.  But taken together as a group, what they point out is that 
characterizing the international investment law regime as a transnational 
public governance system does not, on its own, necessarily resolve the 
tensions between investor and non-investor rights.
 128
  In fact, it may do no 
better than the private dispute settlement characterization of the regime on 
this score.
129
  The end result would seem to depend upon which particular 
approach to “public governance” is adopted. 
3. Evaluating the two paradigms 
Does one perspective nevertheless take better account of the 
competing stakeholders’ interests than the other?  At first blush, the 
private dispute settlement story appears to align well with the interests of 
the foreign investors protected by the regime, at least when they find 
themselves appearing as claimants in disputes with host states.  After all, 
investors who file investor-state arbitration claims against host states do so 
for self-interested reasons.  They do not principally concern themselves 
with the broader societal reverberations of their claims.  Rather, they seek 
to obtain individual satisfaction of their grievances.  A view of 
international investment law which focuses on its role as an efficient 
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 I note that parallel discussions about this difficulty are also occurring within 
international law more broadly.  See, e.g. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to 
Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 518–23 (2005); CUTLER, 
supra note 41.  See also Laura Dickenson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 
YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (2006); Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); LAURA A. DICKINSON, 
OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PROTECTING PUBLIC VALUES IN AN ERA OF PRIVATIZED 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011). 
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 An illuminating side-by-side comparison of public international law and private 
international law conflict resolution techniques can be found in Ralf Michaels & Joost 
Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws? Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of International Law, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (2012). 
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means for settling specific disputes comports well with their objectives as 
investor-claimants.
130
   
As soon as an investor takes off its claimant hat and dons its award-
holder’s hat, however, the picture changes.  At that point, the investor’s 
main concern is to obtain actual payout on the award.  But to the extent 
that the award itself – by failing to show sufficient deference to 
governmental regulatory prerogatives – invites civil society criticism and 
generates political opposition, the investor faces a correspondingly 
reduced prospect of recovery.  The actual investor-friendliness of the 
private dispute settlement model, at the end of the day, is thus inversely 
related to the degree to which non-investor concerns are negatively 
impacted (or perceived to be impacted) by the award.
131
   
The public governance framing, on the other hand, excels in 
accounting for the interests of all who stand outside of the immediate 
investor-state relationship – broadly speaking, civil society. It takes a 
holistic view of a state’s obligations, placing the state’s duties to foreign 
investors under international investment law alongside its duties to its own 
citizens under domestic law and to other national and transnational 
constituencies under other bodies of international law.  The public 
governance view thus incorporates civil society concerns to a much 
greater degree than the private dispute settlement story.   
Its major weakness is that it paints with too broad a brush.  While 
many investor-state disputes do raise important governance concerns, as 
illustrated by the Suez, Abaclat, and Philip Morris cases, not all of them 
do.  It is not clear what might be gained by analyzing ordinary investor-
state breach of contract claims, for example, through the lens of global 
administrative law, global constitutional law, or international public law.  
Most of the authors writing within the transnational public governance 
stream have so far left such disputes to the side.  Given that contract-based 
disputes likely outnumber treaty-based disputes in any given year, this 
omission is significant.
132
  It could lead to the promulgation of regime 
reform recommendations (like abolition) that are entirely out of whack 
with the underlying realities of investor-state arbitration. 
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 Whether this view is also preferred by foreigners in their role as putative investors is a 
more difficult question.  It depends upon strategic and market-based considerations, such 
as whether the putative investor would be indemnified against any losses caused by 
changes in the host state’s regulations in circumstances wherein a major competitor 
would not be so indemnified (e.g. because the latter doesn’t enjoy the protection of an 
investment treaty) or the other way around. 
131
 The investors who hold awards against Argentina as a result of its financial crisis – all 
of which remain unpaid – can attest to this inverse relationship.  See Come and Get Me, 
Argentina is Putting International Arbitration to the Test, THE ECONOMIST (Feb 18, 
2012), at: http://www.economist.com/node/21547836. 
132
 The precise number of contract-based investor-state claims is not known, since most 
of them are probably arbitrated in venues other than ICSID and are therefore never made 
public. 
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What about states’ interests within the regime?  Again, it might appear 
that the public governance framing of international investment law does a 
good job of taking these into account.   If states are viewed as faithful 
representatives of their citizenry – consistent with the traditional 
Westphalian legal fiction – then this might well be so.  But since quite a 
few of the states participating in the international investment law regime 
are not of the democratic sort,
133
 it is doubtful whether the interests of 
states are always aligned with the interests of their domestic constituencies.  
Some states might be quite happy to sacrifice certain public welfare 
objectives on the altar of foreign investment protection (and thus prefer 
the private dispute settlement model); others less so.   
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that states appear only as 
defendants (never claimants) in treaty-based investor-state disputes.
134
  
When operating at the international treaty-making level, by contrast – as 
they do when concluding investment treaties – states occupy the driver’s 
seat.  They view themselves as sovereigns bound by nothing but their own 
voluntary consent.
135
  International relations scholars have long argued 
that power differentials among states play a key role in the making and 
sometimes breaking of international law.
136
  If they are right, then it is 
difficult to see why strong states should embrace the idea of international 
investment law as a type of transnational public governance regime, since 
this would entail an unnecessary relinquishment of their power advantages 
on the international plane.  In short, neither side of the international 
investment regime’s ongoing public versus private categorical debate 
seems to fully capture the interests of investors, states, or third parties.
137
 
All of this begs the question whether the tension is really about the 
regime’s “public” versus “private” nature at all, or whether these labels are 
misnomers serving to obscure deeper normative disagreements between 
competing sets of stakeholders.  In the next part, I peel back the onion a 
bit further by asking what meaning the terms “public” and “private” 
actually have in the everyday practice of international investment law. 
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 In the past 10 years, for example, China has been one of the most active countries in 
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Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall:  the New Generation Investment Treaties of the 
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 At least not when viewed from a rational choice perspective. 
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II. BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY:  INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW’S PUBLIC/PRIVATE OVERLAPS AND DISJUNCTIONS 
Legal scholars have historically distinguished between public and 
private along three classical axes.   The first is the distinction between 
public and private actors; the second, between public law and private law; 
and the third, between public international law and private international 
law.  In this part, I consider whether any of these classical distinctions is 
borne out by international investment law, such that the debate over the 
regime’s public versus private nature might be meaningful along one or 
more of the three axes. 
A. Public and private actors and functions 
One possible means of differentiating between public and private is to 
look at the actors involved.  This can be done in one of two ways.  The 
first is to reserve the term “public” exclusively for states and their 
subnational levels of government and apply the label “private” to all non-
state actors.  This seems to be the usage underlying the public/private 
tension in the Abaclat case:  the public (state) fisc is put in peril by the 
financial claims of private (non-state) actors.  The second way of 
differentiating between public and private is to make a distinction between 
the individual and the collective.  The Suez case illustrates this usage by 
pitting the contract rights of private (individual) investors against the 
general public’s (collective) right of access to water.  Regulatory chill 
concerns appear to blend the two usages.  In the Philip Morris dispute, for 
example, the fear is that privately held (by individual, non-state actors) 
intellectual property rights might make regulating in the interests of public 
(collective) health too expensive for the public (state) fisc. 
How do these two actor-based usages line up with the structural 
features of international investment law?  To answer this question, it is 
necessary to consider the lawmaking and dispute resolution levels of the 
regime separately.  On the lawmaking side, investment law’s three main 
permutations involve three different sets of actors.  International 
investment treaties are concluded between states (public-public).  
Investment promotion and protection statues are enacted unilaterally by 
domestic governments (public).  Investor-state contracts are negotiated 
between specific states and specific investors (public-private).  As a result, 
an actor-based public/private distinction seems to signal potential 
public/private conflicts at the substantive lawmaking level only in the case 
of investor-state contracts,
138
 and then only if the state/non-state usage is 
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 This observation seems counterintuitive in light of the fact that most of the recent 
public outcry over international investment law has been directed at treaty-based law, not 
investor-state contracts.  One possible explanation might be that the obviousness of the 
public/private tensions inherent in investor-state contracts leads states to negotiate them 
much more carefully than investment treaties, the majority of which were not expected 
(at least not at the time of their original negotiation) to have much public bite. 
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adopted. The individual/collective usage has no obvious relevance to the 
investment lawmaking process.
 139
 
At the level of dispute resolution, by contrast, there is always 
nominally a government on one side of the equation and an investor on the 
other.  This holds true irrespective of whether the dispute arises under a 
treaty, statute, or contract.  Thus, all three types of disputes appear, as a 
matter of first impression, to comport with the state/non-state usage of the 
public/private actors divide.  This impression breaks down upon closer 
inspection, however.  Most disputes arising under investor-state contracts 
involve ordinary commercial transactions.  In commercial relations, 
respect for principles such as the autonomy of the parties and the need to 
preserve the benefit of their bargain requires adjudicators to treat states as 
ordinary contracting parties, which essentially turns these disputes into 
private-private affairs. 
Treaty-based and statute-based disputes are different in that they need 
not involve a specific contract between an investor and a state
140
 and need 
not arise out of ordinary commercial relations.  Even so, it is not 
obligatory that the dispute must be between a state and a non-state actor.  
State-owned enterprises make up only a tiny fraction of transnational 
corporations worldwide, but their outward investment accounted for 11% 
of global FDI in 2012.
141
  Similarly, while relatively few countries 
maintain sovereign wealth funds, those that do have a huge number of 
assets under management, many of which are invested abroad.
142
  And 
since most investment treaties and domestic investment statutes don’t 
exclude state-owned companies or sovereign wealth funds from their 
broad definitions of investors and investments,
143
 it is entirely possible to 
have state actors on both sides of the dispute.
144
  The arbitration 
community, at least, appears to accept that this is so.
145
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Conversely, it is also possible to have non-state actors in interest on 
both sides of the dispute.  This can happen where a state delegates a 
governmental function to a non-state company, and then the company 
does something that violates the state’s investment treaty or statutory 
obligations toward a foreign investor.
146
  Here the international law 
principles on attribution come into play to transform the non-state 
company into a state actor, thereby rendering the state liable for the 
company’s actions under international law.147  All of these scenarios seem 
to undermine the utility of the strict state/non-state distinction between 
public and private in international investment disputes.
148
   
As for the individual/collective distinction, it too suffers challenges.  
First there is the question of whether claims by multiple claimants may 
properly be classified as individual, and if so, up to what threshold.   Most 
investment disputes have historically involved between one and five 
claimants.  In the Abaclat matter, however, 180,000 claimants participated 
in the initial filing.  If international investment law has now entered an era 
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in which mass arbitrations are possible, then pouring public and private 
tensions through the individual/collective sieve begins to fit ill.   
In addition to the numbers problem, there are questions as to who is 
counted among the collective and who gets to speak for the collective 
interest.  Some commentators have pointed out that the activities of non-
governmental organizations might qualify as protected investments under 
investment treaties.
149
  This raises the prospect that an investment dispute 
might involve a state (as representative of the public) on one side versus a 
civil society organization (as representative of the public interest) on the 
other.  Which one speaks for the collective “public” in such a case?  Does 
it matter whether the state is democratic or authoritarian?  Does the 
breadth of the civil society organization’s support base – local, national, 
transnational – make a difference?  What if the civil society organization 
is a business lobby instead of a human rights or environmental group? 
This points to another drawback of the individual/collective taxonomy: 
the difficulty in ascertaining the degree to which particular rights or 
interests actually benefit discrete individuals (e.g. particular investors) 
versus society as a whole.  The ICSID Convention was concluded in the 
belief that the protection of individual investor rights would increase the 
cross-border flow of investment to developing countries, which would in 
turn stimulate their economies and improve the general welfare of their 
populations.
150
  Unfortunately, empiricists have found little support for the 
first leg in this chain of assumptions.
151
 
But by the same token, the competing thesis – that the societal good is 
best advanced through the assertion of collective rights – is also contested.  
This is because the concept of “public interest” is vulnerable to capture by 
specialized interest groups.  Just as it may be difficult to determine in 
which circumstances the protection of individual investor rights may serve 
the collective interest, it may be equally difficult to ascertain whether the 
rights and interests asserted by actors other than investors actually serve 
the collective interest versus that of the asserting party.  As one scholar 
has noted: 
If, however, “public” means serving the interest of the 
community, and “private” means serving the interest of the 
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individual, it may be a conceptual error to separate the 
“public” from the individuals within it.  The terms “public” 
and “private,” if used to describe community or individual 
returns, may be similar to that proverbial glass of water, 
which may be half full or half empty depending on 
perspective.  A different terminology is in order, one that 
does not automatically tar one perspective as selfish and 
one perspective as altruistic.  …  Many of the so-called 
public interests represent the individual preferences, desires, 
or convictions of the parties supporting them.
152
 
Such difficulties suggest that individual and collective rights are 
inseparably intertwined.  Both may play an important role in protecting 
and promoting the interests of society, just as both may be used to protect 
and promote the interests of individuals.   
For all of these reasons, neither of the principal actor-based 
characterizations of the public/private divide provides a firm anchor to 
which one might attach a meaningful debate concerning the international 
investment law regime’s public versus private nature. 
B. Public international law and private international law sources and 
methods 
Does the divide between public international law and private 
international law supply the distinction sought?  Public international law 
has historically referred to the set of norms “having their source in the 
international community of States”.153  It includes norms binding upon 
states in their relations with one another
154
 and by extension norms 
binding as between states and the international organizations created by 
states.
155
  It also extends to norms applicable in the relations between 
states and individuals in circumstances where these norms derive either 
from international treaties
156
 or from customary international law.
157
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By contrast, private international law – or international conflict of laws, 
as it is referred to in some jurisdictions
158
 – comprises “the body of norms 
applied in international cases to determine the judicial jurisdiction of a 
State, the choice of the particular system or systems of law to be applied in 
reaching a judicial decision, and the effect to be given a foreign 
judgment.” 159   These rules may derive either from domestic or 
international law.
160
 
Contemporary international investment law, meanwhile, allows for the 
three basic types of claims by foreign investors against states already 
described above:  treaty-based, contract-based and statute-based. 
161
  In 
considering the three classes, the first (treaty-based claims) clearly 
originates in public international law;
162
 the second (contract-based 
claims)
163
 will in most cases call for the application of private 
international law rules; and the third (claims based on domestic investment 
statutes) may implicate either public or private international law, or indeed 
neither or both, depending upon the terms of the domestic statute.   
Can it fairly be said that at least one of these types is fundamentally 
about private dispute settlement while another is about public governance?  
In a word:  no.  The central difficulty in all three types of claims lies in 
deciding how to reconcile states’ obligations toward investors on the one 
hand, with their obligations toward non-investors, on the other.  This 
difficulty arises irrespective of whether public international law or private 
international law applies. 
If one limits the scope of the inquiry to investment disputes brought 
under international investment treaties, as many authors on the public 
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 See e.g. ALBERT V. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1908). 
159
 Stevenson, supra note 153 at pp. 561-62.  Note however that some of these issues may 
be removed from the realm of private international law by treaty.  This is the case, for 
example, with the New York Convention, supra note 1.  
160
 Stevenson, supra note 124, at 564–67 (discussing “diverse views of the relationship” 
between public and private international law, some of which give pride of place to 
international law and others to municipal law). 
161
 The latter two possibilities were the ones primarily envisaged by the ICSID 
Convention at the time of its adoption.  Existing IIAs did not then provide for investor-
state dispute settlement, only state-to-state arbitration.  Indeed, the possibility of treaty-
based investor-state dispute settlement appears to have taken the international arbitration 
community by surprise.  See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10(2) ICSID REV. 
– FOREIGN INV. L.J. 232 (1995). 
162
 In many treaty-based disputes, arbitral tribunals may also find it necessary to have 
recourse to principles of private international law to determine the extent of an investor’s 
rights under an international contract (since contract rights constitute a protected interest 
under most investment treaties) or in applying a treaty’s “umbrella clause”.  
163
 For a discussion of the problem of reconciling investors’ private rights with public 
interests under a concession contract, see Laura Henry, Investment Agreement Claims 
under the 2004 U.S. Model BIT: A Challenge for State Police Powers? 31 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 935, 936 (2010). 
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governance side of the debate have done,
164
 the basic problem unfolds as 
follows.  Most investment treaties grant a specified set of arbitrally 
enforceable protections to a defined class of foreign investors.  These 
protections necessarily exist under public international law, since the 
protection-granting instrument is itself an international treaty.  But other 
public international law instruments protect the rights of individuals and 
groups other than investors in diverse areas, including human rights, 
environmental protection, cultural preservation, financial regulation, trade, 
and international peace and security.   
This multivalent norms scenario was precisely the sticking point in the 
Suez case discussed above.
165
  There, several NGOs invoked the Argentine 
consumers’ right to water under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in opposition to the investors’ assertion of their 
investment treaty-based right to realize the full extent of their profit 
entitlements in respect of the Buenos Aires water concession.  Both sets of 
obligations arose out of public international law.  Both were subject to the 
public international law principles governing the interpretation of 
treaties.
166
  The central conflict manifested itself as one of public 
international law versus public international law.  Yet this did not prevent 
the arbitral tribunal from deciding the dispute under the private dispute 
settlement model while civil society pundits decried its negative public 
health impact.
167
 
What of private international law?  Do contract-based investor-state 
disputes, at the very least, fall squarely within the realm of private dispute 
settlement, to the exclusion of public governance concerns?  Often, 
perhaps, but not always.  To see why not all contract-based disputes are of 
purely private concern, one need only imagine what the Suez dispute 
might have looked like had it proceeded as a contract-based arbitration 
rather than as a treaty-based one.
168
  This alternate scenario would involve 
the same facts, the same contractual rights, and the same set of public 
policy concerns (the right to uninterrupted access to water) that emerged 
in the wake of Argentina’s economic crisis.  The legal claims and defenses 
                                                 
164
 The above-mentioned works by Montt, Schill, Schneiderman, and Van Harten, supra 
note 11, for example all deal only with treaty-based investor-state disputes. 
165
 See Suez – Award, supra note 76 and accompanying discussion. 
166
 Vienna Convention, supra note 83, arts. 31–32. 
167
 The same problem arises in disputes brought pursuant to domestic investment statutes.  
In such cases, domestic law defines the scope of the investors’ rights and the state’s 
obligations to the investor and likewise defines the scope of non-investors’ rights and the 
state’s obligations to non-investors.  Statute-based investor-state disputes, too, must 
balance investor and non-investors rights in some fashion.  The difference is that in a 
statutory setting this is usually accomplished by applying the domestic legal system’s 
constitutional and other legal parameters, whereas in the public international law setting 
it should theoretically proceed under the public international law principles governing 
conflict of norms. 
168
 The concession contract did provide for contract-based arbitration of many of the 
investors’ claims.  The decision to initiate a treaty-based arbitration instead was strategic. 
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of the disputing parties would differ, however.  The investors would be 
limited to bringing claims for breach of contract,
169
 since the tribunal 
would have no jurisdiction to decide claims of expropriation and the like.  
The government, for its part, could take advantage of contractual defenses 
that were unavailable to it in the treaty setting, such as impossibility or 
changed circumstances.
170
   
This re-orientation of the dispute would no doubt significantly impact 
the manner in which the case would be pled and defended.  What it would 
not do is alter the fundamental task faced by the tribunal.  The arbitrators 
would still have to decide whether, on balance, the investors should 
receive the full amount of their contractually stipulated 30-year returns 
(expectations damages), or whether, on balance, the circumstances were 
such that some lesser recovery would be warranted (reliance damages, 
perhaps).  In the end, the discretion left to the tribunal in the contractual 
scenario mirrors that of the tribunal in the treaty scenario, because the 
same competing rights and obligations problem appears in both settings. 
Moreover, all putatively private dispute settlement systems are 
embedded in broader public (in the sense of state-sanctioned) legal 
regimes.  They derive their authority, efficacy, and legitimacy from the 
support lent to them by the legal machinery of states.  In contract-based 
investment arbitration, the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards plays this backstop role.
171
  Like 
the ICSID Convention, which serves a similar function in treaty-based 
arbitrations, the New York Convention is a public international law 
instrument.  The public international law and private international law 
sides of the investment arbitration coin are thus integrally linked at the 
enforcement stage irrespective of which body of law breathes life into the 
disputes at the filing stage.    
What these considerations make clear is that the debate over whether 
international investment law is a private dispute settlement system or a 
transnational public governance regime does not map onto the distinction, 
such as it is, between private international law and public international law.  
In consequence, this division cannot provide a conceptual foothold for 
either perspective.   
                                                 
169
 And perhaps some ancillary claims arising by reason of the contract, such as unjust 
enrichment or tortious conversion of property. 
170
 Though these might be unsuccessful, given that good faith principles in contract law 
typically estop parties from claiming these defenses in circumstances where their own 
behavior led to the change in circumstances or made it impossible to fulfill the contract.   
171
 New York Convention, supra note 2.  The New York Convention regulates the 
manner and circumstances in which states agree to place their judicial enforcement 
mechanisms at the disposal of parties attempting to collect on international arbitration 
awards. 
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C. Public law and private law claims and defenses 
The third classical public/private distinction found in legal discourse is 
that separating public law from private law.  Both common law and civil 
law systems historically recognized a distinction between these two types 
of law, though on the basis of different legal philosophies.   
In the civil law tradition, private law traditionally consisted of “that 
area of law in which the sole function of government was the recognition 
and enforcement of private rights.”172  The nineteenth century civil codes 
of the major continental European powers concretized these private law 
rights, with property rights and contract rights being paramount among 
them.
173
  The driving consideration behind public law, on the other hand, 
“was the effectuation of the public interest by state action.” 174   As 
explained by Merryman and Peréz-Perdomo: 
Public law had, from this point of view, two major 
components: constitutional law in the classic sense – the 
law by which the governmental structure is constituted – 
and administrative law – the law governing the public 
administration and its relations with private individuals.  In 
private legal relations the parties were equals and the state 
the referee.  In public relations the state was a party, and as 
a representative of the public interest (and successor to the 
prince) it was a party superior to the private individual.
175
 
In the English common law tradition, by contrast, private law rights 
included not only rights in property and contract but also rights of personal 
security and personal liberty.
176
  Blackstone described them as absolute 
rights “inherent in every Englishmen”,177 comprising “either that residuum 
of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to be 
sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil privileges, which 
society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up 
                                                 
172
 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PERÉZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA, 92 (3
rd
 ed. 
2007). 
173
 Id. at 93.  Family law, rights of succession (trusts and estates) and delict (or tort) are 
also among the subject matters that may fall under private law in civil law systems, 
though different civil law jurisdictions may classify some of these matters differently. 
174
 Id. 
175
 Id. at 94.  As the authors go on to note, the civil law reinforced this distinction by 
dividing the court system into two branches:  administrative courts (overseeing public 
law matters) and ordinary courts (handling private law matters).  This correspondence 
was not always perfect however, as criminal law (widely considered in the continental 
European tradition to be a matter of public law) was assigned to the ordinary courts rather 
than the administrative courts. 
176
 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 125, 130, 134.  
Interestingly, the latter two categories would have included many rights that we now 
identify as human rights (and consequently associate with public law, not private law). 
177
 Id. at 125. 
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by individuals.”178  These private common law rights were held to pre-
exist statutory (or codified) law – a view subsequently transferred to 
American law as well.
179
  19
th
 century Anglo-American jurists conceived 
of public law rights, for their part, as “claims that were owned by the 
government – the sovereign people as a whole – rather than in persons’ 
individual capacities.”180   Regulatory claims by individuals against the 
government did not originally fall under the domain of public law.
181
    
Over time, of course, the traditional civil law and common law 
distinctions between public law and private law have both confronted 
theoretical and practical difficulties.  The rise of the regulatory state – 
under the auspices of modern constitutions explicitly limiting the scope of 
private rights in accordance with the public interest – has made it apparent 
that the content of private rights is shaped not solely by their definition in 
civil codes but by their circumscription by public law principles.
182
  Where 
public law plays an important role in defining the private rights of 
individuals inter se, the government can no longer be seen as a mere 
neutral referee resolving private disputes between private parties.
183
 
The trend toward increasing government participation in market-based 
economic activities, meanwhile, undermines the traditional assumption 
that all government action necessarily occurs within the public law 
domain;
184
 this accordingly questions the entitlement of governments to a 
superior status in all legal proceedings.  Moreover, in the contemporary 
Anglo-American understanding, the government no longer holds a 
monopoly over public law.  Individual citizens and groups of citizens may 
now assert public law claims against the government or against other 
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 Id. at 134.   
179
 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 171 (1803) (mentioning the 
“absolute rights of individuals”); JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 
(1827) (“The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal 
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.  These 
rights have been justly considered, and frequently declared, by the people of this country, 
to be natural, inherent, and unalienable.”). 
180
 Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1015, 1020 (April 2006) (internal citations omitted).  See also id. at 1021 (listing five 
classes of rights falling within the 19
th
 century conception of public rights). 
181
 This understanding slowly morphed, however, such that by the late 20
th
 century public 
law rights had taken on “a broad connotation of constitutional or statutory claims asserted 
in the perceived public interest against government or regulated parties.”  Id. at p. 1021 
(citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1284, 1316 (1976)). 
182
 See MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PERÉZ-PERDOMO, supra note 172 at 94–96 (exploring 
five challenges to the distinction and concluding that “dichotomies like public law and 
private law seem to lose their utility”). 
183
 See references cited supra, notes 14-19. 
184
 Id. 
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private citizens.
185
  These challenges and others have forced both civil and 
common law scholars to propose doctrinal modifications to traditional 
public law/private law divisions,
186
 with the result that they no longer 
correspond tightly to the distinction between personal and societal rights. 
In the United States, one may even go so far as to say that the concepts 
of public law and private law have in any event lost much of their force.
187
  
Modern U.S. law faculties are not divided into public law and private law 
departments, as are many of their counterparts in other parts of the world.  
And while subject matter specializations proliferate, most U.S. scholarly 
writing now treats law as a unitary rather than bifurcated field.
188
  
Interestingly, despite this erosion – or some might say confusion – in the 
distinction between public and private law, U.S. lawyers and legal 
scholars have served as the primary progenitors and champions of the 
“public interest law” movement, which seeks to strategically deploy the 
law in furtherance of the common (as opposed to individual) good.
189
  
This may help to explain why American NGOs have been at the forefront 
of attempts to re-align international investment law with the “public 
interest.” 190   Indeed, the modern American concept of public interest 
law
191
 might be the idea that best explains the ongoing drive to reconcile 
public and private interests within international investment law. 
                                                 
185
 Woolhandler supra note 180 at 1021–22 (describing this new breed of public law 
claims as a hybrid between the 19
th
 century classifications of public law and private law 
claims). 
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 For a comparison of U.S. and German evolutions in the concepts, see Ralf Michaels & 
Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, 
Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2006). 
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in the United States, see Chaim Saiman, Public Law, Private Law, and Legal Science, 56 
AM. J. COMP. L. 691, 692–97 (2008); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, 
in PHILOSOPHY OF THE COMMON LAW 625, 630 (2002) (noting that the predominant 
position had become one of regarding “the distention between private and public law as 
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 See Scott L. Cummings and Louise G. Trubek, “Globalizing Public Interest Law,” 13 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2008) (providing an account of the globalization of 
the American practice). 
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The International Institute for Sustainable Development (a Canadian organization) is 
another leading example.  See http://www.iisd.org/investment/.  
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 For U.S. perspectives on why lawyers should perform public interest work, see Tigran 
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Be that as it may, the upshot of the present discussion is that using the 
terms public and private says little about the underlying legal classification 
of the rights at stake in the contemporary investment regime.  Most 
international investment agreements allow investors to claim damages for 
harms done to both private law and public law rights.  This is so whether 
one adopts a civil law or common law understanding of the terms.  For 
example, the typical investment treaty’s expropriation clause empowers 
investors to claim damages for violations of their property and contract 
rights (traditionally private law claims), while its fair and equitable 
treatment clause empowers them to claim damages for violations of 
certain public law rights, such as the rights to procedural fairness, 
transparency, and non-discrimination.  On the other side of the dispute, 
states may raise either private law defenses – for example defenses of 
justification or excuse for breach of contract – or public law defenses such 
as public necessity.  A given dispute may indeed involve a complex 
mixture of several types of claims and defenses.   
In short, many investment arbitration cases simply do not fall neatly 
along public law/private law lines.  Debates over the appropriate role of 
international investment law in regulating the world economy nevertheless 
continue to be framed in public versus private terms.  If one looks closely, 
however, the principle questions underlying what the relevant actors 
perceive to be the public/private dilemma are twofold:  firstly, who 
benefits from the competing rights and interests at stake, and second, how 
and by whom are the competing claims to be balanced?  This is so 
irrespective of whether the competing rights and interests sound in public 
law or private law in any particular legal tradition.
192
 
D. What’s left:  public and private as decision rules? 
 If none of the three classical legal distinctions between public and 
private rings true in international investment law, we are left with a puzzle:  
why has the debate over the regime’s essential nature shaped up in 
public/private terms?  The most prominent explanation advanced to date 
centers on the sociologically fractured epistemic community of 
international investment lawyers.
193
  Since the majority of investment 
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arbitrators come from private law or commercial dispute settlement 
backgrounds, the argument goes, and the majority of investment law 
scholars come from public law or public international law backgrounds, it 
makes sense that the former would view the regime’s function in private 
terms and the latter in public terms.
194
  To a person with a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail. 
Anyone who has ever attended two investment law conferences on the 
same topic in the same year – one organized by a group of public law 
scholars and the other by representatives of the “arbitration mafia” – can 
attest that this explanation carries weight.  It would be difficult to 
overstate how differently the discourse unfolds across the two conference 
settings.  Still, most articulations of the sociological explanation are 
incomplete in that they focus on only a subset of the investment regime’s 
epistemic community without taking sufficient account of other subsets, 
such as state lawmakers and treaty negotiators, civil society activists, the 
in-house counsel of large multinational companies, and the institutional 
personnel who staff the major arbitration institutions.
195
 
An illustration from the civil society angle will help explain why one 
should not focus the sociological camera lens too narrowly.  Civil society 
advocates primarily invoke the public/private rhetoric for its emotive 
value.
196
  I presaged this point in the headings used to introduce the three 
public/private clashes described in Part I above – all of which reflected the 
emotive framing of the public interest perspective.  After all, what could 
be worse than allowing private property rights to trump public health 
concerns (Philip Morris) or private contract rights to compromise the 
public’s access to water (Suez) or private profit expectations to wipe out 
the public fisc (Abaclat)? To ask the question in this manner is to 
presuppose the answer.  It taints the investment law regime with a sense of 
injustice, which in turn assists public interest groups in mobilizing 
resources to advance their particular viewpoints. 
Yet industry groups are civil society organizations too.  They, too, can 
deploy public/private rhetoric as an emotional subtext to help them 
                                                                                                                         
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, (Douglas, Pauwelyn, Vinuales, 
eds., forthcoming 2013) (on file with author); David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and 
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Julie A. Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and 
the Murky, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters, 
eds., forthcoming 2012), (analyzing the investment law regime’s major transparency 
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Transparency]. 
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 Examples of civil society arguments can be found in the references cited supra, note 
36.  Most of the amicus briefs that have been filed in investor-state disputes can be 
downloaded on the Investment Treaty Arbitration website, at  http://italaw.com/. 
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achieve their objectives.  After all, if private businesses serve the greater 
good by creating employment, driving technological innovation, and 
fueling economic growth, what could be worse than allowing a greedy 
government to abolish hard-earned private property rights without paying 
any compensation (Philip Morris) or abuse its sovereign powers to 
appropriate to itself all of the benefits of a bilateral contract (Suez) or 
invoke sovereign immunity to avoid repaying its debts to the investors 
who have financed its very existence (Abaclat)?  Framing the same three 
disputes in the inverse manner evokes a similar emotional reaction to the 
seeming unfairness of the underlying events – at least in the absence of the 
other side of the story. 
This consideration of how civil society organizations use the terms 
“public” and “private” usefully brings two insights to the fore.  First, 
emotional associations derived from particular viewpoints can enable the 
public/private rhetoric to take the place of considered deliberation.  
Decisions concerning how to reconcile conflicting interests in a particular 
investment dispute then become implicit in the choice of labels applied.  
Second, this maneuver supplies instantaneous decision rules.  If the 
circumstances of an investment dispute set off an arbitrator’s public 
protection alarm, then he or she may in good conscience decide the case in 
favor of the state.  If, to the contrary, they set off the arbitrator’s 
government abuse alarm, she or he may find for the investor.  Finally, if 
both sets of warning bells sound simultaneously, the arbitrator may find a 
way to split the baby.  Rational reasons for any of the three decisions can 
always be supplied after the fact.
197
 
One could levy a whole host of criticisms against the idea of applying 
emotive associations as decision rules.  Indeed, I will devote the remainder 
of this paper to showing why the approach I have just described must give 
way to an integrated systems perspective on the international investment 
regime’s conflict of rights dilemmas instead.  But before moving on to that 
final task, I wish to pause for a moment to consider the merits – from the 
point of view of the regime’s stakeholders – of the current approach.   
The chief advantage of employing latent public/private associations as 
decision rules is that the sociological (political, cultural, ideological, etc.) 
predispositions triggering an actor’s gut-level reactions need never be 
disclosed, let alone critically examined and dealt with.  This benefits treaty 
negotiators by enabling them to conclude agreements with states whose 
value systems differ from their own.
198
  It benefits investors by 
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 See generally, MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE 
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 A number of scholars explain the phenomenon of vague treaty provisions as instances 
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open-ended in order to conclude the treaty, which effectively shifts the task of 
establishing the provision’s meaning to some future dispute resolution process. 
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streamlining negotiations over lucrative state contracts without having to 
stop and consider how political opposition from non-investors might 
impact upon the profitability of the contract (which could impede deal-
making).   
Sequestering contested values propositions away in a black box also 
benefits civil society groups, whether “public interest” groups or industry 
groups.  They get to espouse their emotive stories, and sometimes achieve 
their preferred outcomes, while dodging thorny questions concerning what 
makes their values important or valid or legitimate and why their values 
should trump the potentially equally valid competing values of others.  
Scholars similarly gain the freedom to conceive of and promote theoretical 
approaches to the investment law regime’s public/private problems which, 
if implemented, would result in the privileging of their particular 
normative suppositions over those of others. 
All of these efforts to promote contested viewpoints by dressing them 
up in public/private rhetoric share something in common:  they all 
effectively shift the task of deciding between competing value 
propositions to the dispute resolution level of the regime.  This explains 
why investor-state arbitration tribunals have become the major object of 
attack from all quarters.  Woe to the arbitrators, one might say!
199
  Yet 
herein lies the rub.  Investment arbitrators tend to be accomplished 
individuals of high repute who strive to render decisions in a manner that 
is consistent with their own personal values.
200
  Understandably, however, 
they have no more desire than anyone else to submit those values to 
general scrutiny.  And because arbitrators sit at the pinnacle of all of this 
ongoing systemic contestation, they are the ones who stand to benefit most 
by taking cover behind seemingly clear-cut decision rules.  This, in turn, 
explains why many of the regime’s most difficult base questions have 
remained perpetually unanswered.   
To admit this is not to endorse the status quo, but merely to 
acknowledge the gravitational pull of the regime’s present course.  I now 
turn to consider what might be done to move the international investment 
law debate beyond the cyclical trap of public/private smoke and mirrors in 
the future. 
III. THE INTEGRATED SYSTEMS APPROACH 
 I have argued that there can be no neutral ordering as between 
public and private rights within international investment law, nor between 
public governance and private dispute settlement; the operative value 
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decisions inhere in the labeling exercise itself.  As Karl Llewellyn put it in 
his discussion of the use of precedent in the 1930s (presaging international 
investment law’s jurisprudential inconsistency problem by some decades): 
If deduction does not solve cases, but only shows the effect 
of a given premise; and if there is available a competing but 
equally authoritative premise that leads to a different 
conclusion--then there is a choice in the case; a choice to be 
justified; a choice which can be justified only as a question 
of policy--for the authoritative tradition speaks with a 
forked tongue.
201
 
This statement rings even truer in international investment law, which has 
no doctrine of precedent and an even greater diversity of “competing but 
equally authoritative premises” than the constitutionally constrained 
common law system Llewellyn was analyzing.  I therefore propose, as did 
Llewellyn, “let this be recognized.”202   
 Effectuating this recognition requires international investment lawyers 
to move beyond the current categorical debate.  I suggest that we do so by 
analyzing the regime from an integrated systems perspective.  In the 
remainder of the paper, I explain how this proposal works and why it is 
better able to address international investment law’s most pressing 
problems than the existing public governance and private dispute 
settlement modes of analysis. 
  
A. Integrated systems analysis and its potential utility 
 The term “system” can of course mean different things to different 
people.  It is therefore pertinent to note some of the principal ideas with 
which the term has been associated and explain how these relate to the 
more pragmatic notion of an “integrated system” I employ here. 
 Within the life sciences community, the branch of study known as 
systems theory sprang up from a broad array of scientific and 
philosophical roots over the course of the 20
th
 century.  The person 
credited with first articulating it in a rigorous form was Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, an Austrian-born biologist.
203
  Bertalanffy criticized the 
traditional method of biological study, which tended to “equate the 
                                                 
201
 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1252-53 (1930-1931) (footnotes omitted). 
202
 Id. at 1253. 
203
 Bertalanffy developed his views on theoretical biology and general systems theory 
from the 1920s through the 1970s.  Some of his best known works include:  Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, Theoretische Biologie (1952), Vom Molekül zum Organismenwelt (1956); 
Problems of Life (1960); Biophysik des Fliessgleichgewichts (1961); Allgemeine 
Systemtheorie und die Einheit der Wissenschaften, Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale 
di Filosofia, vo. IV, Firenze (1962); Robots, Men and Minds (1965); Organismic 
Psychology and System Theory (1967); General System Theory (1968); and GENERAL 
SYSTEM THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATION (1971). 
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structure of the organism with that of the machine” – a “conglomeration of 
separate elements” – and viewed it as “something static, acting only under 
external influence”.204  In place of this limiting view, Bertalanffy made the 
case for an open systems approach to biology which saw the organism as 
an active and continually changing system that possessed internal 
organization and wholeness.  He insisted that the best way to study 
organisms was to take a dynamic approach – a view he later generalized to 
scientific study writ large as well as to philosophy.
205
   
 Bertalanffy’s analysis proved at once simple and powerful, and it has 
since been taken up with enthusiasm by scholars in other fields.  In legal 
scholarship, perhaps the best-known contributions have come from Niklas 
Luhmann
206
 and Gunther Teubner.
207
  These scholars describe law as an 
“autopoietic” system – aka a self-referential communicative process which 
recursively constitutes and maintains itself.
208
  In this depiction, a legal 
system’s particular set of self-referencing relationships is what 
differentiates the system from its surrounding environment, and the 
communicative acts that instantiate and validate these relationships are 
what enable the system to generate a cohesive internal order amidst a sea 
of external complexity and chaos.  Autopoietically autonomous systems 
are then postulated to be connected to one another and to their 
environment through “structural couplings” – designated pathways 
through which information from the outside can enter, be processed by, 
and relayed throughout the system.
209
   
 In short, for Luhmann and Teubner, social systems – whether legal, 
political, or otherwise – are at once “operatively closed” and “cognitively 
open”.  That is, although they are structurally self-referential, they are 
nevertheless connected to and able to respond to information emanating 
from outside of their own self-constructed boundaries.
210
   
                                                 
204
 I.V. BLAUBERG, V.N. SADOVSKY, & E.G. YUDIN, SYSTEMS THEORY, PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (Sergei Syrovatkin & Olga Germogenova trans., 
1977), p. 44. 
205
 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory as Integrating Factor in 
Contemporary Science and in Philosophy, Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongresses für 
Philosophie, Bd. II, Wien, 1968, S. 335-240. 
206
 See, principally, NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Klaus A. Ziegert 
trans.,  2003); and earlier NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Edith 
King & Martin Albrow transl. 1985), pp. 281-88. 
207
 GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (European University Press, 
1992). 
208
 The term autopoeisis comes from the Greek αὐτo- (auto-), meaning “self”, and ποίησις 
(poiesis), meaning “creation, production.” 
209
 LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 206 at ch. 10;  
210
 Teubner in particular has vigorously defended the notions of operational closure and 
cognitive openness against attacks from later “open systems” theorists.  See e.g., Gunther 
Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in Gunther Teubner, ed. AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A 
NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (1987), p. 2: 
A radical closure of the system – under certain conditions – means its 
radical openness.  This is one of the most challenging theses of 
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 More recently, the rise of complex adaptive systems theory has 
colored the word “system” with yet another set of influential ideas.  In 
simplified form, a complex adaptive system is “a system in which large 
networks of components with no central control and simple rules of 
operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated 
information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution.”211 
 All of these branches of systems scholarship are fascinating, and it is 
easy to imagine how each might yield insights into the functioning of the 
international investment law regime.  But it is not my present aim to 
provide a definitive exposition of the various branches of systems theory 
or to debate their merits at an abstract level.
212
  Nor do I seek to establish 
the superiority of one branch over the others as an analytical lens for the 
study of the investment regime.  My goal is instead much more limited 
and concrete.  Namely, if I am correct about the malleable and 
interdependent nature of the investment regime’s “public” and “private” 
characteristics, then it seems plausible that at least some of the regime’s 
major sources of dissatisfaction might be addressed through minor 
interventions within the existing regime.  Viewing the regime as an 
integrated system – in the common sense notion of the phrase – supplies a 
simple conceptual framework with which to test this hypothesis. 
 There are at least three reasons to believe that the exercise might prove 
fruitful.  First, as I have emphasized above, the international investment 
law regime consists of many moving parts.  It rests upon a complex web 
of thousands of overlapping treaties, investment statutes, and contracts.  It 
encompasses hundreds of arbitral decisions issued by arbitrators from 
dozens of different countries applying numerous different bodies of law.   
And it impacts in complex ways upon investors, states, and a broad swath 
of other individuals and groups.   
   Second, much like Bertalanffy’s living organism, all of these moving 
parts display a pattern of internal organization and wholeness.  As in 
Luhmann and Teubner’s description, the investment regime’s organization 
is not hierarchical, but rather communicative in nature.  Its substantive 
                                                                                                                         
autopoietic theory.  The more the legal system gains in operational 
closure and autonomy, the more it gains in openness toward social facts, 
political demands, social science theories, and human needs. 
211
 MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY A GUIDED TOUR (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
p. x.  See also John H. Holland, Studying Complex Adaptive Systems, 19 (1) JOURNAL OF 
SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND COMPLEXITY 1 (2006)  <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/41486> 
(defining CAS as “systems that have a large numbers of components, often called agents, 
that interact and adapt or learn)”. 
212
 For an extensive critique of the biological theory and its application, see BLAUBERG, 
SADOVSKY, & YUDIN, supra note 204, Part II.  For a critique of Luhmann’s social 
systems theory, see Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve 
Lectures, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA [Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: zwölf 
Vorlesungen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1985.], pp. 368-85 (“Excursus on Luhmann's 
Appropriation of the Philosophy of the Subject through Systems Theory”);   
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legal obligations are generated variably by treaty negotiators, domestic 
legislatures, and specific investors and host state officials.  They are then 
concretized by counsel, expert witnesses, and arbitrators over the course of 
successive investor-state disputes.  A small but non-exclusive set of 
arbitration-related institutions, meanwhile, mediates the way in which 
investment law principles are developed and applied by promulgating 
different procedural rules and processes for the conduct of investor-state 
arbitration.   
 Once a specific award has been issued, domestic courts in the 
enforcing state determine whether to enforce the award (under the New 
York Convention),
213
 or the executive branch of the host state decides 
whether to comply with the award (under the ICSID Convention).
214
  On 
the back end, civil society groups of all sorts attempt to shift the regime in 
the direction of their respective competing normative preferences by 
pressuring states to change substantive law, institutions to change 
procedural practices, arbitrators to change interpretive methodologies, and 
courts to change enforcement schemes.  In short, the international 
investment law regime’s many layers are systemically organized and 
thickly interconnected via multi-directional feedback loops. 
 Third, each of the international investment law system’s constituent 
sub-parts is active, not static (as emphasized by complex adaptive systems 
accounts), with the result that the system as a whole is dynamically 
evolving in real time.  New states continue to join the ICSID Convention 
each year,
215
 and many countries remain committed to concluding new 
investment treaties.  On the other hand, some states have registered their 
disapprobation of what they regard as the regime’s excessive 
encroachment upon their regulatory powers.  They have done so by 
pulling out of the ICSID Convention,
216
 narrowing the scope of their 
treaty-based substantive obligations,
217
 terminating existing bilateral 
                                                 
213
 The New York Convention, supra note 2, allows the courts of an enforcing state to 
refuse recognition or enforcement if granting it would violate the public policy of the 
enforcing state. 
214
 The ICSID Convention, supra note 2, obligates all states parties to comply with any 
award issued under the Convention.  In practice, most states do, with the notable recent 
exceptions of Argentina and Zimbabwe. 
215
 The list of states that either signed or ratified the ICSID Convention between Jan. 1, 
2010 and July 25, 2012 includes:  Cape Verde, Montenegro, Qatar, and South Sudan.  
ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of July 25, 
2012), at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
ContractingStates&ReqFrom=Main. 
216
 Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have all formally denounced the ICSID Convention 
(in 2007 2009, and 2012, respectively), and Nicaragua has threatened to do so.  The 
respective ICSID news releases announcing the denunciations are available at: 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDBibliographyRH&act
ionVal=goIndex. 
217
 The United States and Canada have moved to narrow the scope of their obligations to 
foreign investors, both by issuing restrictive ex post interpretations of NAFTA and by 
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investment treaties,
218
 or moving to exclude investor-state arbitration from 
future investment agreements.
219
   
 Prominent arbitrators, in turn, are reacting to these developments in a 
proactive manner.  It is not uncommon nowadays to see arbitrators 
lambasting other arbitrators in the form of scathing dissents,
220
 public 
speeches,
221
 or scholarly articles
222
 whenever they fear that a particular 
award’s interpretation of a state’s obligations toward a foreign investor has 
either gone too far or stopped too short.  A few even appear to have 
reversed course as a result of these exchanges, departing from their own 
past arbitral decisions in some instances.
223
 
 Consistent with the notion of cognitive openness, these re-alignments 
suggest that dynamic potential rests in each of the international investment 
law system’s many joints.  This should be music to the ears of critics who 
are unhappy with the current status quo.  It means that it might well be 
possible to address some of the regime’s most pressing problems without 
having to resolve the intractable public system/private system debate.  In 
the next section, I demonstrate how this might work in practice by 
illustrating three ways in which the degree of protection afforded to 
investor versus non-investor rights at one level of the regime can be 
significantly shifted by introducing a modest change at some other level of 
the regime.  The idea, with each example, is to take advantage of at least 
                                                                                                                         
amending the model texts upon which their future bilateral investment treaties will be 
negotiated.  For contrasting appraisals of these developments, compare Stephen 
Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: an Exercise in the 
Regressive Development of International Law, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 (2006); 
Roberts, supra note 66. 
218
 Jana Marais, South Africa, European Union Lock Horns, BUSINESS TIMES (Sep. 23, 
2012), available at: http://www.bdlive.co.za/businesstimes/2012/09/23/south-africa-
european-union-lock-horns (reporting that South Africa has terminated its bilateral 
investment treaty with Belgium and Luxembourg and has announced its intention to 
terminate its BITs with all other European states). 
219
 Luke Eric Peterson, In Policy Switch, Australia Disavows Need for Investor-State 
Arbitration Provisions in Trade and Investment Agreements, INV. ARB. REP. (Apr. 14, 
2011), available at  http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110414.  
220
 Arbitrator Pedro Nikken wrote a pointed dissent from the above-discussed Suez award, 
for example.  See Suez – Dissenting Opinion, supra, note 67. 
221
 See, e.g. Brower, supra note 13. 
222
 See, e.g., Brigitte Stern, ICSID Arbitration and the State’s Increasingly Remote 
Consent: Apropos the Maffezini Case, in LAW IN THE SERVICE OF HUMAN DIGNTITY, 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO (S. Charnovitz, D. Steger and P. Van den 
Bossche, eds., 2005) 246. 
223
 Most recently, arbitrator Domingo Bello Janeiro completely recanted his previous 
interpretation of the Argentina-Germany BIT’s jurisdictional requirements for the 
institution of investor-state arbitration proceedings.  See Daimler, supra, note 52, Opinion 
of Professor Domingo Bello Janeiro (Aug. 16, 2012) (recanting his earlier holding on the 
same question in Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2004)), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1084.pdf. 
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one of the regime’s dynamic feedback loops – to treat it, in other words, as 
an integrated system. 
B. Three illustrations:  how integrated systems analysis can be used to 
reshape international investment law
224
 
1. A textual reform 
At present, few if any investment treaties contain a clause specifying 
the manner in which arbitrators should take into account a host state’s 
various obligations toward non-claimants when interpreting that state’s 
obligations toward a particular foreign investor under the treaty.
225
  
Several commentators have stressed that articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provide guidance in this matter.
226
  
Unfortunately, the Vienna Convention has proven insufficient to ensure 
much consistency of approach in practice.
227
  Tribunal members tend to 
interpret treaty provisions in accordance with their understanding of the 
regime’s essential function – whether as a private dispute settlement 
system, a public governance system, or otherwise.
228
  This generates 
inconsistent interpretations of the same treaty provisions, which raises rule 
of law concerns.  More troubling still, from a regulatory point of view, it 
results in the line between investor rights and non-investor rights being 
drawn in different places by different tribunals from one case to the next, 
even under the same treaty. 
Suppose a state were to address this problem by inserting an explicit 
interpretive clause of the following sort into all of its investment 
treaties:
229
 
                                                 
224
 Each of the examples provided in this section is drawn from my doctoral dissertation, 
which I am presently working to turn into a book.  See JULIE A. MAUPIN, RECONCILING 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:  
CONCRETE OPTIONS AND THEIR PRESENT AND FUTURE TENABILITY (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
225
 Some, like the U.S. Model BIT 2012, supra note 21, contain exceptions clauses for 
certain types of governmental measures, but I have yet to see a treaty with a general 
interpretive clause. 
226
 See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge Viñuales, Human Rights and Investment 
Disciplines: Integration in Progress, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, Part 4.B (M. 
Bungenberg, et al., eds., forthcoming 2012). 
227
 On the regime’s jurisprudential inconsistency problems, see Franck, supra note 41; 
Maupin, supra note 65. 
228
 See generally Roberts, supra note 106. 
229
 Note that some treaties outside of the investment law context do contain clauses 
specifying how they are to be interpreted when their provisions come into conflict with 
the provisions of other treaties.  See e.g. art. 22 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
which states: 
[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing 
international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and 
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Interpretation & application 
When interpreting and applying this treaty in any dispute 
between a Contracting Party [“the host State”] and an 
investor of the other Contracting Party [“the investor”], a 
tribunal: 
1) Must explicitly address in its written decision any 
conflicts as may arise, on the facts of the dispute, 
between the host State’s obligations toward the 
claimant(s) under this treaty and its concomitant legal 
obligations toward parties other than the claimant(s) 
which derive from:  
a) the provisions of this treaty;  
b) other international agreements to which the host 
State is a party; and  
c) the fundamental rights provisions contained in the 
host State’s highest domestic law. 
2) Must calculate the amount of compensation due to 
claimant(s) by reason of the host State’s violation of 
any provision of this treaty in such a manner as to avoid 
making it infeasible, either in law or in fact, for the host 
State to simultaneously satisfy its obligations to the 
claimant under this treaty and its concomitant 
obligations to other persons under the bodies of law 
specified in paragraph 1) above. 
 What impact might this interpretive clause have upon a competing 
rights dilemma of the kind raised by the Suez v. Argentina water 
privatization dispute profiled above?
230
  Quite evidently, a tribunal 
applying this clause would be precluded from resolving the dispute in the 
superficial “no de jure conflict” manner adopted by the Suez tribunal.  The 
tribunal would instead be obliged to address the potential de facto conflict 
between Argentina’s human rights obligation to ensure uninterrupted 
access to water to the citizens of Buenos Aires and its contractual 
obligation to ensure a pre-specified rate of return to the claimants.   And if, 
as the dissenting arbitrator in Suez argued, the financial crisis rendered 
Argentina temporarily incapable of directly subsidizing the price of water 
at the stipulated contractual level in the wake of the massive depreciation 
of the peso, the tribunal would be forced to adjust its compensation award 
                                                                                                                         
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological 
diversity. 
Convention on Biological Diversity art. 22, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
230
 See infra, at15–16. 
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accordingly.
231
  At the initial award stage of the international investment 
law regime, then, this type of interpretive clause would result in shifting 
the balance struck between investor rights and non-investor rights in the 
direction of non-investors. 
 The billiard balls do not stop there, however.  How might the clause 
subsequently impact upon developments at the review and enforcement 
level of the regime?  By staving off the issuance of awards that place 
states between a legal (or financial) rock and a hard place, the inclusion of 
this type of interpretive clause could well lead to a decrease in the 
percentage of annulment and set-aside requests lodged by states under the 
applicable enforcement conventions.
232
  This would most likely improve 
pay-out rates on arbitral awards by reducing the political cost of 
compliance for the respondent state.
233
  It might even soften civil society 
opposition to the regime, thereby reducing the pressure on states to either 
abandon the regime or narrow the scope of their substantive legal 
commitments to foreign investors.  All three of these developments would 
move the balance back toward the investor side of the equation.  
Moreover, by providing guidance on how conflicts between investor rights 
under an investment treaty and the rights of non-investors will be resolved, 
an interpretive clause would improve legal certainty for both investors and 
states.  This would allow investors to build more accurate regulatory risk 
assessments into their investment planning.  States, for their part, would 
enjoy greater certainty as to the limits of their potential financial liability 
to foreign investors when undertaking governmental regulatory activities.  
2. An institutional reform 
 One difficulty with any textual reform of the sort just proposed is that 
it could only be implemented comprehensively by amending or replacing 
some 3000 existing treaties – a difficult and lengthy process.234  The major 
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 Dissenting arbitrator Pedro Nikken, a human rights lawyer by background, suggested 
the tribunal should have excused Argentina from abiding by the original contractual 
terms during the acute portion of the crisis but required Argentina to re-establish the 
contractual equilibrium once Argentina had sufficiently recovered from the crisis (which 
Argentina failed to do).  Suez – Dissenting Opinion, supra note 67, ¶¶ 35-44. 
232
 Between 1965 and 2000, ICSID tribunals issued around five original arbitral awards 
for every annulment decision (annulment proceedings were thus initiated in respect of 
about 16% of the awards).  From 2001 to 2010, the ratio was 3.7:1 (annulment 
proceedings initiated in respect of 21% of awards).  In 2011, the ratio climbed to 2.1:1 
(annulment proceedings initiated in respect of 30% of awards).  See ICSID CASELOAD – 
2012, supra note 24, chart 8, at 15.  To my knowledge, there are no similar statistics 
available in respect of set aside proceedings registered under the New York Convention. 
233
 Contrast this to the current situation, in which several investors hold large awards 
against Argentina in consequence of the measures taken in response to the country’s 2001 
financial crisis, but Argentina has so far refused to pay any of them, probably because to 
do so would be to commit political suicide. 
234
 It should be noted however, that the European Union’s plan to replace 1407 bilateral 
investment treaties with new comprehensive EU-wide treaties may make the textual 
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arbitral institutions that administer investor-state disputes, on the other 
hand, do not face the same kinds of collective action and bargaining power 
dilemmas faced by treaty negotiators.  ICSID has already taken advantage 
of this fact on at least one prior occasion.  In 2006, it amended its 
procedural rules to stipulate that ICSID tribunals may accept amicus 
curiae briefs from non-disputing parties and that the ICSID Secretariat 
would begin publishing final awards – or at the very least excerpts of their 
underlying legal reasoning – on its website.235 
 Suppose ICSID similarly decided, of its own initiative, to take up the 
challenge of ensuring that investor-state tribunals take account of non-
investor rights when deciding investor-state disputes adjudicated under the 
ICSID arbitration rules.  There are several ways in which it might 
approach the task.  One possibility would be to add a step to the 
procedural intake process.  Upon certifying the constitution of a new 
tribunal, the ICSID Secretariat typically designates one of its legal 
counsels to act as secretary to the tribunal.  These individuals are highly 
competent and experienced lawyers who labor, at the pleasure of ICSID’s 
member countries, as international civil servants.  They provide a broad 
range of services for ICSID tribunals behind the scenes.   
 Suppose that at the time of this designation, the secretary is tasked 
with preparing a memo on the basis of the initial request for arbitration 
and the respondent state’s response to the initial request.  In this memo, 
the secretary flags the potential conflicts of rights that he or she perceives 
might arise on the facts as between the host state’s investment law-based 
obligations to the claimant and its obligations to other persons arising out 
of the bodies of law specified in the above-proposed interpretive clause.  
The secretary then provides the memo to the tribunal and to the parties, 
and the Secretariat also publishes the memo on the ICSID website. 
 In the Philip Morris claim described above, for example, the secretary 
might note the following potential sources of conflict. Australian law 
creates and limits the scope of intellectual property rights within the 
territory of Australia.  In addition, several international treaties govern the 
obligations of states in recognizing and protecting within their borders the 
intellectual property rights granted by other states.  Among these, 
Australia is a party to: the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
                                                                                                                         
reform route a very viable possibility in the near future.  See generally Julie A. Maupin, 
Where Should Europe’s Investment Path Lead? Reflections on August Reinisch, “Quo 
Vadis Europe?,” in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, Symposium 
Edition (invited contribution), SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. __ (forthcoming 2013).  
235
 See Rule 48, ICSID Arbitration Rules (2006) and Rule 53, ICSID Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules (2006), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
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Industrial Property.
236
  It is also a party to the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which requires 
Australia to use all reasonable efforts to reduce smoking,
237
 including 
through the use of tobacco packaging regulations.
238
 
 The major weakness of such a secretarial memo is that it would have 
no legal force in the arbitration proceedings.  Disputing parties are always 
free to develop and defend their arguments however they see fit, and the 
tribunal hearing the dispute must remain free, as before, to direct the 
proceedings and resolve the claims entirely in accordance with its 
authorized discretion.   
 Nonetheless, the mere fact of the publication of the secretary’s memo 
would likely produce three results.  First, it would alert outside persons to 
the existence of legal questions in respect of which they may have an 
interest in submitting amicus briefs.  Second, it would alert the tribunal to 
the potential that the dispute may raise controversial conflicts between the 
investors’ claims and the competing claims of others who are not before 
the tribunal, which – if not dealt with delicately – could ultimately impact 
upon the award’s enforceability.239  Third, it would frame the questions 
raised in a comprehensive and less partisan manner than would otherwise 
be the case were the questions to receive their initial framing solely from 
the self-interested pleadings of the disputing parties.   
 Whether or not this practice would affect the arbitral outcomes of 
individual disputes is anyone’s guess.  But looking at the proposal from 
the integrated systems perspective once again raises some interesting 
possible interaction effects.  A tribunal that paid heed to the issues raised 
in the secretary’s memo might find itself better insulated against an 
attempt, by one of the disputing parties, to annul the award on the grounds 
that the tribunal either failed to apply the applicable law or failed to state 
reasons for its decision.
240
  Here again, this scenario might prove more 
investor-friendly than the alternative, since an award that is overly 
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 As pointed out by the claimants, Philip Morris – Notice of Arbitration, supra note 6, at 
¶ 6.6. 
237
 See Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, entered into force Feb. 27, 2005, 
2302 U.N.T.S. 166, art. 5(3) (“In setting and implementing their public health policies 
with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial 
and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”). 
238
 Id., art. 8. 
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 Jan Paulsson has recently argued that tribunals should take public policy into account 
when rendering their decisions, since producing an enforceable award is one of their 
primary duties.  Alison Ross, Seoul, Paulsson Ponders Public Policy, 7(4) GLOB. ARB. 
REV. (2012). 
240
 These are two of the most frequently cited grounds for annulment under the ICSID 
Convention. 
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dismissive of non-investor rights may be more susceptible of annulment or 
non-payment.
241
   
 There could also be some inter-institutional competition effects.
242
  
Many investment treaties allow investors to choose among several arbitral 
fora when initiating a claim.  Thus, if ICSID were to adopt the practice of 
publicizing this kind of secretarial intake memo, investors who wish to 
avoid a public vetting of potential conflicts between their claims and the 
rights of non-disputing parties might opt for a non-ICSID arbitral forum 
instead.  Such a development could shift the balance away from non-
investors and toward investors.   
 But here again, countervailing reactions are to be expected.  Civil 
society advocates might well respond by dropping their opposition to 
ICSID and re-directing their lobbying efforts against non-ICSID arbitral 
forums.  If so, this could prompt states to eliminate from their treaties the 
provisions that allow investors to choose among forums.  The mere threat 
of this possibility might even persuade the non-ICSID arbitration 
institutions to adopt the secretarial memo practice as well.  Here again, it 
is difficult to predict precisely what new equilibrium between investor and 
non-investor rights this proposal would generate in the end.  What is clear, 
however, is that it could effectuate a significant re-calibration of the 
system no less than the more cumbersome textual reform route posited 
above. 
3. An enforcement reform 
 As a third possibility, suppose that states who are concerned about the 
preservation of their regulatory space are unable to persuade some of their 
investment treaty partners to adopt any kind of treaty revision (whether an 
interpretive clause or otherwise).  Suppose further that institutional culture 
and related reasons prevent not only ICSID but all of the major arbitration 
institutions from adopting any kind of institutional reform.
243
  Would this 
mark the end of the story, making all internal systems-inspired reform 
proposals dead in the water?  Not necessarily.  States still control multiple 
levers within the system, and they can press on these at any time.
244
   
                                                 
241
 As demonstrated by the recent split decisions of ad hoc annulment committees 
concerning the scope and effect of Argentina’s necessity defense under both treaty law 
and customary international law.  
242
 To my knowledge, there has been very little comparative investigation of the role 
played by the major arbitral institutions and their procedural rules, including ICSID, the 
PCA, ICC, LCIA, SCC, and UNCITRAL.  I have outlined one possible research agenda, 
which I hope to take up in the near future, in Maupin – Transparency, supra note 195. 
243
 This is a real possibility, as evidenced by the continual failure of the UNCITRAL II 
Working Group to fulfill the Commission’s 2008 mandate to promulgate a new set of 
arbitration rules specifically tailored to the needs of treaty-based (as distinct from purely 
commercial) arbitrations. 
244
 Which implies, of course, that civil society groups can pressure them to do so. 
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 A state that is unhappy with ICSID can withdraw from the ICSID 
Convention on six months’ written notice245 – as Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia have all done.
246
  This move does not insulate the exiting state 
from future investor-state claims, since many investment treaties allow 
investors to bring claims in other arbitral fora.  Even so, withdrawing from 
the ICSID Convention might allow the state, at the enforcement level of 
the regime, to exercise a greater degree of control over how arbitral 
tribunals balance investors’ rights against non-investment concerns.  This 
is because investment arbitration awards issued outside of the ICSID 
framework are subject to enforcement under the New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.  Unlike the 
ICSID Convention, the New York Convention allows states to refuse to 
recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral award on certain public policy 
grounds.
247
  These include circumstances in which enforcing the award 
would violate the public policy of the enforcing state and cases where the 
award has been set aside by a competent authority of the state under 
whose law the award was made.
248
 
 An example from the U.S. enforcement context will help to clarify 
how these facts might be used to alter the balance between investor and 
non-investor rights in practice.  What would happen if Philip Morris, 
having obtained a several billion dollar award against Australia as 
compensation for its lost profits under the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, 
sought to enforce the award by attaching Australian assets in the United 
States?  The U.S. court considering the attachment request would look to 
the Federal Arbitration Act, which gives domestic effect to the New York 
Convention.
249
  Motivated by commercial efficiency justifications, U.S. 
courts have developed a longstanding tradition of respecting the finality of 
arbitral awards under this Act.   
 There is good reason to think a U.S. court might prove less amenable 
to enforcing an award like the hypothetical Philip Morris one, however.  
An award against Australia on the facts of the Philip Morris dispute would 
essentially amount to an international finding of a domestic regulatory 
taking.  When it comes to foreign regulatory measures, U.S. courts tend to 
show a high degree of deference to foreign states for reasons of both 
comity and reciprocity.  After all, U.S. regulators do not wish to see their 
own regulatory actions result in the attachment of U.S. government-owned 
                                                 
245
 ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 71. 
246
 See supra note 216. 
247
 Much of the existing scholarship on the two conventions compares their parallel 
provisions or reviews how these have been applied in specific cases.  But since investors 
can often choose which of the two conventions their disputes will proceed under, what is 
needed is an analysis of the interplay between the two enforcement systems. 
248
 New York Convention, supra note 2, art.V. 
249
 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208.  In more monist systems, the 
corresponding provisions of the New York Convention would apply directly. 
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assets abroad.  These considerations would weigh all the more heavily if 
the arbitral award were to be formally set aside by the Australian courts.
250
 
 Even if current U.S. judicial practice did not portend enforcement 
problems in cases like Philip Morris v. Australia, the U.S. legislature 
could move to preempt the question altogether by amending the Federal 
Arbitration Act.
251
  It could do this, for example, by directing the courts to 
apply a stricter type of public policy review when considering the 
enforcement of treaty-based and statute-based arbitration awards which 
grant investors monetary compensation on account of a foreign 
sovereign’s regulatory measures.252 
 Bifurcating the review standards under the New York Convention in 
this fashion would be unorthodox, but it would offer three key advantages.  
First, it would not impede commerce by upending a country’s tradition of 
respecting the finality of arbitral awards in ordinary breach of contract 
situations.  Second, in disputes where one of the scenarios originally 
envisaged by the investment law regime’s member states materializes – 
namely, outright governmental expropriation or physical destruction of a 
particular foreign investor’s property253 – the enforcement process would 
remain smooth and swift.  Third, in cases where the underlying cause of 
action is a generally applicable sovereign regulatory measure, a bifurcated 
review standard would allow different states to follow variegated 
enforcement policies tailored to the strictures of their internal 
constitutional structures and the preferences of their domestic 
constituencies.
254
  This would effectively re-introduce a considerable 
measure of democratic (or at least domestic) accountability to the investor-
state arbitration system on the back end, at least in respect of the category 
of cases that is most likely to raise significant domestic and international 
policy concerns.   
 In the end, the degree to which the bifurcated enforcement reform I 
suggest would move the regime’s balance from the investor to the non-
                                                 
250
 As it almost certainly would be, given that the Australian High Court has already 
found the maligned TPP Act to be consistent with the Australian constitution. 
251
 Argentina and Zimbabwe have shown that outright refusal to pay out on investor-state 
awards is also an option.  But as this flies in the face of the rule of law, I would hesitate 
to endorse it so long as other, perfectly legal means of addressing systemic problems 
(such as the legislative fix I suggest) might be pursued. 
252
 The basic idea here is that domestic courts in enforcing states should review the 
awards of investor-state tribunals more closely, on public policy grounds, whenever there 
is reason to doubt that the institutional process underlying the award will guarantee that 
the tribunal took sufficient account of the respondent state’s competing obligations to 
non-investors. 
253
 See, e.g. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 June 1990) (claim for compensation for complete 
destruction of shrimp farm by government military forces during battle with Tiger rebels). 
254
 Some countries – notably within the EU – are quite comfortable with the idea of 
submitting to supranational judicial review of domestic regulatory measures.  Others, 
such as the U.S., are much less  
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investor side of the equation would depend upon the policy decisions of 
each state’s domestic legislature, as well as the degree of deference to 
such decisions shown by the enforcing courts of other states.
255
  These 
nuances aside, the larger point is that any enforcement reform is likely to 
have a significant impact upon the way in which arbitrators decide 
investor-state disputes, since arbitrators whose awards exhibit a high rate 
of non-enforcement will lose out on future appointments. 
4. Summary of integrated systems based reforms 
 What the three foregoing examples show is that treaty negotiators, 
arbitral institutions, domestic legislators, civil society advocates, and 
arbitrators all have it within their power to make moves that prompt other 
actors within the regime to adjust their behavior.  Each of these moves 
entails ripple effects that reverberate throughout the system.  Even minor 
moves at one level of the regime can produce major shifts in the way in 
which the regime impacts upon investor versus non-investor rights and 
interests in practice.  
 Because some reforms may be additive in their effect while others 
work at cross-purposes, the best way to strategically direct the evolution of 
this dynamic integrated system is to experiment with minor changes in a 
successive fashion.  The difficult part is determining which experiments 
should be performed first.  The answer will depend upon which specific 
elements of the regime’s current legitimacy and accountability deficits one 
finds most troubling. The integrated systems approach cannot answer this 
normative question.  Its chief virtues, rather, are descriptive and 
predictive.
256
  In effect, an integrated systems analysis of international 
investment law reveals three things: 
 
 how different types of normatively-motivated reforms can be 
implemented within the confines of the existing system;  
 
 who within the existing system has incentives to attempt to 
push the system, and in which direction they are likely to push; 
and  
 
                                                 
255
 Historically, participating states within the New York Convention system have shown 
a high degree of deference to the enforcement policy decisions of other member states, as 
would be expected under existing comity doctrines.  There are exceptions, however. 
256
 See Teubner, supra note 207, p. 1 (“autopoiesis proposes, as a new and promising 
research strategy, to identify circular relationships within the legal system and to analyze 
their internal dynamics and their external interactions”). 
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 at what points the system is capable of accommodating 
differentiated, country-specific approaches while still hanging 
together as a system.
257
 
 
 My own prescriptive inclination, as revealed by the above three 
proposals, is to start by trying out different means of ensuring that 
important non-investment related policy goals are not overshadowed by 
the policy goal of protecting foreign investors.  The Suez, Abaclat, and 
Philip Morris case studies all underscore the need for recalibration on this 
point. I therefore advocate beginning the experimental process 
immediately.  But because complex integrated systems can respond to 
slight stimuli in unpredictable ways, reform strategies should work up 
incrementally from the conservative to the more sweeping, allowing 
sufficient time in between to see how the system as a whole adapts to each 
new innovation.  In the final part of the paper, I explain why this 
integrated systems approach is preferable to each of the three major 
alternatives on offer. 
C. Comparing the integrated systems approach to the alternatives 
1. The status quo alternative 
The easiest alternative to dispense with, in my view, is that of 
maintaining the status quo.  The problems I have profiled throughout this 
paper are afflicting the international investment law regime with an 
unprecedented level of turmoil.  The system faces pressure to change from 
within and without.
258
   Almost no one is satisfied with the current state of 
affairs.  States find it too costly; investors find it too unpredictable, and 
critics find it too intrusive upon non-investor concerns.  Moreover, the 
regime is already evolving at a rapid pace
259
 – albeit not yet in a coherent 
or uniform direction.  To simply sit back and continue to allow the system 
to evolve haphazardly would, I argue, be as unwise as it would be unlikely 
to produce desirable results.  Better to learn from the regime’s tumultuous 
history than to repeat the mistakes of its past.  This makes it incumbent 
upon the regime’s supporters and detractors alike to think through what 
                                                 
257
 There is a fourth insight to be gained from the approach, namely how the system 
responds to, incorporates, or rebuffs external stimuli from closely related systems (e.g. 
the WTO system) and less-closely related systems (e.g. the international human rights 
system).  This avenue of inquiry promises to be fruitful, but cannot be pursued within the 
confines of this paper. 
258
 See, e.g. Investment, Arbitration and Secrecy: Behind Closed Doors, a Hard Struggle 
to Shed Some Light on a Legal Grey Area THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13527961. Moreover, specialized news publications like 
the INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER and the GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW now 
provide daily reporting and critique of developments in investor-state arbitration. 
259
 Precisely as the integrated systems perspective would predict. 
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should be done about the fact that the international investment law system 
is today performing some feats for which it was never designed.
260
 
2. The multilateralization alternative 
An alternative to the status quo approach would be to attempt to 
multilateralize the regime.  Were it possible to replace the whole 
patchwork of overlapping investment instruments, arbitral institutions, 
enforcement mechanisms, etc. with a unified regime, many of the regime’s 
consistency problems would go away.  Creating a new, globally uniform 
system from the ground up would also give regime architects (principally 
treaty negotiators and domestic legislatures) the chance to hammer out 
more democratically legitimate and accountable means of protecting the 
rights of investors and their investments abroad.  Alas, the international 
community of states appears unlikely to reach a multilateral accord on 
investment anytime soon.  Every prior attempt to do so has failed,
261
 and 
civil society opposition to the idea of a multilateral regime has grown to 
such proportions that it is no longer even feasible for most countries to put 
a multilateral investment agreement on their negotiating agendas. 
Even piecemeal centralization proposals have met with resounding 
rejection in recent years.  When the ICSID Secretariat floated the idea of 
creating an ICSID Appellate Body in order to bring some consistency to 
the splintered ICSID arbitral jurisprudence,
262
 the proposal was widely 
rejected
263
 and quickly withdrawn.
264
  The difficulty is that states with 
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 On this point, I note that some scholars are advancing what I consider to be a corollary 
to the status quo alternative which may be deemed the “change in mindset” alternative.  
On this view, any necessary adjustments to the regime could be made simply by changing 
the mindset of the arbitrators who decide investor-state disputes, for example by 
convincing them to adopt a comparative public law perspective.  (See Schill (ed) – IIL & 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW and Schill – New Public Law Approach, both supra note 11.)  
While I see the appeal of this approach in terms of its ease of implementation, there is 
little evidence to-date to suggest that arbitrators have the necessary incentives to adopt a 
changed mindset – at least not in the absence of some kind of structural reform which 
goes beyond the usual social compliance norms of the arbitrator community.  See e.g. 
David Schneiderman, Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International Investment Arbitration: 
A New Self-Restraint?, Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011), Socio-Legal Aspects 
of Adjudication of International Economic Disputes, ISSN: 2079-5971, at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832564 (concluding that the 
arbitrator community has not reflexively responded to major public interest critiques of 
the system); Van Harten – Arbitrator Behaviour, supra note 72 (arguing that arbitrators 
lack the incentives to restrain their own behavior). 
261
 For an overview of the multiple failed attempts to create a multilateral agreement to-
date, see VAN HARTEN, supra note 9, at 18–23. 
262
 ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper, Possible Improvement of the Framework for 
ICSID Arbitration, Oct. 22, 2004, Part VI. 
263
 For one critique, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, In Search of Transparency and 
Consistency, 2(5) TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2005). 
264
 Interestingly, the U.S.-Chile, U.S.-Morocco, U.S.-Singapore, and U.S.-DR-CAFTA 
Free Trade Agreements all contain a provision requiring the contracting parties to each 
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different political structures and at differing levels of development can’t 
seem to agree on what the overarching values governing any kind of 
multilateral regime should be.  This disagreement, after all, is why the 
“investment law as transnational public governance system” and 
“investment law as private dispute settlement system” approaches I 
described above have little hope of solving the existing regime’s major 
problems.  They begin from opposite starting points, and there is no super-
legislator, no global constitution, from whence to derive the super-values 
necessary to prefer one over the other.
265
 
3. The abolition alternative 
Finally, I come to the million dollar question (or billion dollar question, 
if you’re standing in Australia’s, Germany’s, or Belgium’s shoes):  why 
should we keep this strange system in which foreign arbitrators sit in 
judgment over domestic regulatory actions at all?  Why not just abolish 
the regime altogether, as some have proposed?   
My answer is a pragmatic one.  Notwithstanding all of the regime’s 
well-known problems, it is still not clear whether it is doing more harm or 
good, on balance.  What has become increasingly clear is that international 
investment treaties do not seem to increase investment flows to the 
countries that sign them.
266
  Thus, a major justification for the investment 
treaty regime’s creation does not hold water.  But investment treaties may 
have other salutary effects that have not yet been sufficiently explored.  
For example, they may contribute to the rule of law by inducing 
governments with less than exemplary track records to respect due process 
requirements when enacting new regulatory measures or carrying out 
expropriations.
267
  Such process improvements could spill over into other 
areas, thereby promoting good governance and improving respect for 
human rights – to the benefit of domestic constituencies and foreigners 
alike.
268
 
                                                                                                                         
treaty to enter into negotiations concerning the possible establishment of a bilateral 
(regional, in the case of DR-CAFTA) appellate mechanisms within a certain period of 
time after the entry into force of the treaties.  A similar provision was found in the 2004 
U.S. Model BIT, but it was dropped from the recently released 2012 U.S. Model BIT. 
265
 This has long been the major criticism of the global constitutionalism and global 
administrative law literatures more broadly.  See e.g. Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with 
Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527 (2003). 
266
 See Yackee, supra note 56 and the empirical studies summarized therein. 
267
 This justification seems more plausible as applied to host States that have already 
made a political commitment to improve their internal rule of law (Mexico, Argentina).  
Investment treaties do not seem to deter countries that have not made this commitment 
from maltreating both foreigners and citizens (Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Ecuador). 
268
 For other possible justifications, see Stephan W. Schill, Private Enforcement of 
International Investment Law: Why We Need Investor Standing in BIT Dispute Settlement, 
in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, ch. 2 (Michael Waibel et al, eds., 
2010). 
Integrated Systems Approach to Int. Inv. Law 65 
 
 Moreover, as I have emphasized here, the international investment 
law regime does not start and stop with treaties.  Surveys of multinational 
companies suggest that legal certainty is one of the top ten factors taken 
into account in making foreign investment decisions.  If this self-reporting 
is accurate, then countries with under-developed legal systems would 
likely find themselves unable to attract much-needed foreign investment in 
the absence of some alternative means of backing up their domestic legal 
guarantees.  One wonders how much investment the newly created 
countries of North and South Sudan could attract, for example, if the only 
recourse available to foreign investors in the event of bad government 
behavior lay with the domestic Sudanese courts.
269
  Investment treaties, 
contracts, and statutes were devised to address a real problem in need of a 
real solution.  To abolish the entire system on the grounds that parts of it 
are objectionable – without first attempting more targeted fixes – would be 
to throw the baby out with the bath water. 
Finally, even if the process could be set in motion today, it would take 
decades to completely dismantle the present system and would entail 
massive transition costs.  States would first need to go through the formal 
steps required to terminate over 3000 treaties under international law.
270
  
Then, since many of the treaties contain survival clauses, investors would 
still be able to bring investor-state claims for an additional ten years after 
the official date of termination.  If the last ten years is any indication, one 
might expect to see another 350 claims in that period – many of which 
would still raise the kinds of complex regulatory questions described in 
this paper. 
By contrast, the integrated systems perspective I have proposed offers 
up a ready-made toolkit with which policymakers, treaty negotiators, 
lawmakers, arbitrators, institutional employees, civil society advocates, 
scholars, and others can begin addressing the underlying causes of the 
international investment law regime’s “legitimacy crisis” straight away.271  
For this reason, I submit, it promises to be at once more effective and 
more practicable than more drastic alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has put the debate over international investment law’s 
systemic nature into context.  It has shown that the regime’s public/private 
problematic is really a microcosm of a fundamental problem running 
throughout all areas of the law.  To ponder whether the international 
investment regime is a transnational public governance regime or a private 
dispute settlement system is to ask the wrong question.  International 
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 Indeed, South Sudan is already facing its first ICSID claim.  See, South Sudan Hit with 
ICSID Claim from the North, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sep. 6, 2012). 
270
 This process is governed by articles 54–60 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 83. 
271
 On the regime’s legitimacy crisis, see the discussion supra, notes 34 to 41 and 
accompanying text. 
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investment law is at once neither and both of these things.  They are two 
sides of the same coin, and each shapes and defines the other.  The better 
question, therefore, is to consider how the investment regime and its many 
decision-makers should go about handling the inevitable conflicts of rights, 
interests, and values that must arise within a complex regime that serves 
and impacts upon so many diverse stakeholders. 
I have argued that the best method of analyzing this problem is 
through an integrated systems perspective.  Applying this perspective 
paves the way for the conceptualization of experimental, incremental 
reforms that can be introduced at multiple levels of the regime.  It supplies 
means of shifting the overall equilibrium between investor and non-
investor rights through a dynamic, iterative process that is open to input 
from stakeholders and decision-makers espousing diverse views and 
operating at numerous different pressure points.  This openness, in itself, 
makes it possible to begin reducing the international investment law 
regime’s legitimacy and accountability deficits in the near term. Given the 
impracticability of more sweeping alternatives at present, it may be that 
this constitutes not only the best but also the only way forward.  If seized 
upon with a little bit of tenacity and creativity, the integrated systems 
approach just might end up producing a regime that both investors and 
non-investors can live with. 
